BASIC DEMOCRACIES
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION
AND DEVELOPMENT

By
INAYATULLAH

PAKISTAN
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The Present publication is one of the several efforts which Pakistan Academy for rural Development, Peshawar has made to analy7se the problems of rural administration especially Basic Democracies. It has, however, one unique feature which previous efforts lacked. It attempts to present the empirical data in a theoretical framework and relates its findings to most up to date administrative and political theory.

(M.A. SABZWARI)
Research Specialist

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PREFACE

This is the fourth effort on the part of the present writer to analyse the working of Basic Democracies. The present study, however, is wider in its scope and larger in its universe. All the three previous studies dealt only with union councils and the number of union councils in each study did not exceed seven. The present study deals with union councils, tehsil councils and district councils. One third of the total union councils, numbering thirty nine, all the six tehsil and two district representing two sub-cultural areas of West Pakistan have been studied. Another significant aspect of the study is that it analyses the functioning of Basic Democracies in the context of political modernisation of Pakistan society in general and in the framework of district administration in particular. In the absence of a fully representative study, it is hoped that present study would help the social scientists, administrators and policy-makers to have an objective picture of the working of Basic Democracies. .

The report is written with two audience in mind; the professional and the non-professional. Some aspects of the study would be attractive to one group but not to the other. Therefore if one group finds some discussions too technical or the other group finds other discussions too prosaic, the blame should probably be fixed on the level of speclalisation in the society which as yet cannot afford to produce literature for exclusive groups.

The size of the study could have been reduced further had there been only one group of readers in view. There was also an intellectual compulsion for keeping the size as it is. The present study, it is hoped, may stimulate other studies on Basic Democracies. Therefore in order to facilitate subsequent endeavours in this field the different stages in development and preparation of empirical evidence have been described in the text. A shorter Study could eliminate all the intermediate stages of development of data and directly deal with final data which had bearing on the conclusions of the study. An illustration *may clear* what I want to say. An index on attitude towards democracy has been developed out of four questions included in the questionnaire of the study. Study as it is organised at present first presents answers of the Interviewee on each question. Then process of formation of index is described. This is followed by an analysis of the characteristics of the group as

associated with variable being measured by the index. A shorter study could have directly gone to the index, However, whether my decision to keep the study of the size as it is, is wise, could be judged only once it goes in the hands of the readers.

A few words on the history of the study. Considering my earlier studies useful for the administrative decision-making, Brigadier Gulzar Ahmad, the then Additional Director of Bureau of National Reconstruction, Government of Pakistan, suggested that a wider study should be attempted and indicated that Bureau could partly finance the study. Consequently the Director of Pakistan Academy for Rural Development Peshawar, Baja Muhammad Afzal Khan approached the Ministry of Information and National Reconstruction of which Bureau of National Reconstruction was a part, to provide the finance. The Ministry sanctioned rupees 6000/-. Nearly an equal amount was supplemented from Academy's own resources. In the process of negotiation with the Ministry, Mr. Masihuzzanian's interest in scientific study of Basic Democracies proved immensely helpful in expediting the matters. I am therefore extremely grateful to Brigadier Gulzar Ahmad as well as Mr. Masihuzzaman for this help.

A number of people assisted me in the execution of this project. First of all, without assistance from the Director of the Academy several obstacles in my way would it have been overcome. Therefore he deserves my thanks. Mr. M.A. Sabzwari, the Research Specialist, helped me In the recruitment of investigators. His cooperation also is acknowledged. Much of the credit for the success of the project goes to the investigators Mr. Fir Mohammad Anwar, Mr. Karam Ilahi, Mr. Noor Badshah, Mr. Hidayatullah and Mr. Mohammad Azim. Without devoted and methodical work by Mohammad Azim, who was willing to sit with me late in the evening and continued to work for five months even when we were unable to pay him for his services, the completion of the present study would have been postponed for another six months. Mr. Pir Muhammad Anwer also continued to assist me for two months without any renumerations. Their debt I can repay neither in words nor in action.

Mr. Richard O. Niehoff, Coordinator Pakistan Project Michigan State University was kind enough to go through the study and Improve its language The

Research Committee of the Academy which consisted of Dr. Shabir-ud-Din Alvi, Mr. Mohammad Sharif, Mr. MA. Sabzwari and Mr. Minhajuddin have suggested several improvements which I found useful and have been incorporated in the study. Therefore I acknowledge my debt to the Committee. Dr. Alvi's helpful advice and encouragement has been a source of strength in this arduous task. Finally Dr. Glynn Mcbride, Academy Advisor from Michigan State University went through the revised draft and made several improvement. I am deeply indebted to him.

At the end I thank Mr. Zaman Khan, Typist of the General Administration Committee of the Academy who very carefully and intelligently typed most of the manuscript.

(INAYATULLAH)
Instructor
In Public Administration

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PART I

POLITICAL MODERNISATION
AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT *IN PAKISTAN*

Chapter

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The structural functional approach in political science and public administration is being increasingly used and has yielded illuminating insights into the operation of political and bureaucratic systems in newly developing countries.[1] The advantage of this approach is that by investigating how the essential political and administrative functions are performed and through what structures, it makes possible to compare the systems existing in societies at different levels of development without being too concerned with their forms. The most significant insight contributed by this approach is the rejection of polarisation of primitive and modern, democratic and authoritarian, and acceptance of a new theoretical position that all systems are mixed and dualistic rather than pure types.[2] Within a modern democratic system the diffuse, ascriptive and particularistic orientations are not totally eliminated. Nor does the primitive system completely lack achievement, specificity and universalistic orientation. The difference is essentially of degree and not of kind.

Almond has set forth two major categories of functions which a political system performs; the input function and the output function. The input function includes the transmission of claims and demands from the society to polity. The output function is the translation of these demands into administrative actions.[3] The input function includes:-

a). Political socialisation and recruitment.

b). Interest articulation.

1. See Gabrial A. Almond and lames S. Coleman. The Politics of Developing Area. (Princeton, 1960); Gabrial A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton. 1963); Lucian W. Pye, Communication and Political Development Development (Princeton, 1963); William J. Siffin, Towards the Comparative Study of Public Administration (Bombay, 1962).
2. Almond and Coleman, op. cit., pp. 23-24.
3. Almond and Verba, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

c). Interest aggregation

d). Political communication.[4]

Political socialisation is a process through which the new generations in a society develop attitudes, values-standards, and feelings towards the political system.[5] The end product of this process is mainly determined by style of socialisation in the primary groups like family, kinship and other status groups. While in primitive societies the socialisation process stops at the primary stage, in developed societies, the secondary political structure socialises the citizen for specialised political roles.[6]

The political recruitment function is the process of selection, preparation and induction of members of the society for specialised political roles. How the political and administrative leaders are selected and how they are trained is a part of the recruitment function. The difference between primitive and developed societies in regard to the recruitment function is that while the former employs ascriptive and particularistic standards the lalter relies on universalistic and performance standards of recruitment, though the element of ascription fs not totally eliminated from it.7 The interest articulation function is a process of articulating demands, claims and interest of society on the polity. In all types of societies, structures for interest articulation invariably exist and ate categorised into four major categories:

c) Interest aggregation

d) Political communica-tion.4

a) Institutional interest groups.

b). Non-associational interest groups.

c) Anomie interest groups.

d) Associational interest groups.8

The institutional interest groups include legislatures, bureaucracies and armies which besides performing their specialised functions, articulate the interests of their groups. The non-associational interest groups include kinship, ethnic and regional groups which articulate interests informally. The anomie interest groups are the demonstrating and rioting mobs. The associational interest groups are specialised structures of interest articulation like trade unions, organization of businessmen, ethnic associations etc.9 "The structure and style of interest articulation define the pattern of boundary maintenance between polity and

4. Ahànd and Colesi, *op. cit.,* p. 17.

5. *Thd.,* pp. 27.28..

6. *Ibid.,* p. 31.

7. *Ibid.,* p. 32.

8. *Ibid., p.* 33.

9. *Ibid.* p. 35.

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the society, and within the political system affects the boundaries between the various parts of the political system 10 A high incidence of anomie interest articulafion, institutional interest articulation and non-associational interest articulation indicates poor boundaries between polity and society while high incidence of interest articulation through associational interest groups indicates good boundary maintenance.11

The function of the interest aggregation is that of combining and accommodating interests, claims and demands articulated• by different interest groups. Aggregation is done through formulation of general policies or through recruitment of personnel committed to such policies. In modern polity, aggregation of interest is done mainly through political parties though other sub-systems of the political system also partly and casually perform it.. Four political party systems are enumerated by Almond:

a) Authoritarian.
b) Dominant non-authoritarian.
c) Competitive two-party system.
d) Competitive mufti-party system.

The authoritarian type has been further classified into the totalitarian and the authoritarian. The totalitarian parties penetrate into different sectors of the society and control the - process of interest articulation and aggregation. In authoritarian systems this control is less complete and some autonomous interest groups are tolerated.

The political communication function is crucial for the performance of other functions of the political system. The emergence of an autonomous, neutral and objective media of political communication "regulates the regulators', by limiting the regulatory powers of different structures in the political system. By creating an effective body of citizens, such a media ensures a multi-directional flow of information between the masses, interest groups, political parties, legislatures and bureaucracies.

The communication function is common to primitive and modern polities. However, the primitive system relies more on traditional social groups such as the village, caste, factions, etc., for performance of this function while the modern polity employs speciaised structures, such as the radio, newspaper, television, etc., without completely eliminating the traditional media.

10. Ibid,. p. 35.
11. .Ibid., p.39.

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In a modern polity, political communications tend to be homogenous because there exists a nearly homogenous audience capable of comprehending it. In transitional societies, communications tend to be beterogenous, there being a vast difference between the rural and urban, educated and illiterate, and. westernised and the traditional population. There is greater mobility of information in modern polity than in the transitional one where lower physical mobility and distance limits its magnitude. Also the volume of information pumped into the media of communication is far greater in modern polity than the transitional. Finally there is greater communication from output structures, bureaucracies, executives etc., to the people than from input structures in a transitional polity.12

The three output functions are rule making, rule application and rule adjudication which in a modern polity are performed by specialised structures of legislatures, courts and bureaucracies although these structures do not totally monopolise these

functions. It is the characteristic of a modern polity that a definite boundary exists between these structures while in a transitional polity the bureaucracies may be assuming the function of rule making, and the legislatures may be performing the functions of rule adjudication.13

The output structures have been classified by Shils into the following four categories.

a) Political democracies.
b) Tutelary democracies.
c) Modernising oligarchies.
d) Totalitarian oligarchies.
e) Traditional oligarchies.14

The political democracies have autonomous legislatures, courts and bureaucracies as well as autonomous and differentiated interest groups and neutral media of communication. In tutelary democracy, while the polity has democratic structures, there is concentration of power in the executive and the bureaucracies at the expense of judiciary and legislature. The modernising oligarchies are characterised by a concern for efficiency, rationality, clean public life and rapid economic development without immediate concern with development of infra-structure of

12. Ibid,. **pp.** 45-50.
13. Ibid., pp. 5**2**
14. Edward SM1 quoted **in** Ibid,. **p. 53.**

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democratic polity. In a totalitarian oligarchy there is high concentration - of power in the ruling elite and complete penetration of society by polity. The traditional oligarchies are dynastic monarchies, their legitimacy being rooted in tradition and custbm.15

The above conceptual framework developed by Almond has been further refined by him and Verba under the influence of Parsonian sociological theory. **16** The new framework is built upon the earlier theoretical premise that polarisation of primitive and modern is empirically untenable. The modern polities are not able to entirely exclude the influence of diffuse, particularistic and ascriptive elements from among their political orientation. The modern political culture is in fact a 'civic culture' in which the 'political culture and political structures are congruent' and in which 'participant' politic orientations combine with and do not replace 'subject' and 'parochial' political orientations.17

Almond and Verba distinguish between political culture and political structures. By political culture is understood, "the political orientations, and attitudes towards the political system and it5 various parts, and the attitude towards the role of the self in the system. 'lB Political orientations are classified into cognitive orientation, affective orientation and evaluational orientation—the concepts taken from Talcot Parsons. The object of these orientations are classified as —a) general political system —b) input objects —c) output objects and —d) self as the object. On the basis of types of orientations towards different objects political culture has been classified into three major types; a) parochial political culture b) subject political culture and c) participant political culture. The parochial culture is the one in which cognitive, affective and evaluational orientations toward the four objects approach zero There are no differentiated political structures.

In the subject political culture, frequency of orientation towards output aspects and general system is far greater than those towards input and self. The citizens do not assign an active role to themselves, are not disposed towards putting pressure on the political system and bureaucracy which otherwise have a significant bearing on their lives. In the participant political culture, there exist distinct political orientations towards all four objects enumerated above. Distinct from subject culture, in this culture the people have a significant orientation towards the input structure and assign an active role to self.

15. *Ibid.,* pp. 52-57.
16. Almond and Verb *The Civic Cultu re. op. cit., pp.* 12-32.

17. *Ibid., p.* 31.

18. *Ibid., p.* 13.

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For every type of political culture there exists a corresponding political structure in harmony with the culture. Parochial, subject and participant political cultures are congruent with traditional political .authority, centralised political authority and democracy respectively. In actual situation, congruence exists only when culture and structure are in equilibrium. Absence of congruence in reality leads to disequilibrium and consequent political change. If a democratic structure is adopted for a parochial society which is not capable of adjusting its culture to the structure, it is very likely that the structure would collapse) or possibly the structure may generate pressure for changing the culture.

As earlier stated no political culture is of a pure type. Heterogeneity rather than homogeneity is. the most common characteristic of political systems. However, the nature of heterogeneity differs. There may be segments of the population in a society with different polity orientation, but sharing basic orientations of the political culture. on the other hand, different segments of the polity may have entirely contradictory, inconsistent, mutually exclusive basic orientations. Latter is characteristic of transitional polities where side by side a small minority with participant orientation, there exists a sizeable urban segment with subject orientation and a majority from rural and tribal population with parochial orientations. No equilibrium between structure and culture could be achieved here and the polities remain subject to continuous shifts and instabilities.

Recent developments in theories of comparative administration have yielded equally fruitful insights into the operation of different administrative systems.19 Fortunately both comparative political and administrative theories have generally adopted the structural functional approach and have arrived at remarkably similar conclusions. The theoretical framework of only one leading theorist in the field of comparative administration is briefly propounded below.

Riggs originally developed the typology of Agraria and Industria— two types of administration found in predominantly agricultural and predominantly industrial societies respectively.20 Recently be has developed three types: the fused, the prismatic and the refracted—found in undiferentiate4, transitional, and differentiated societies. In the fused society specialised structures for performance of distinct functions are

19. Literature on comparative administration i increasing. A few outstanding contributions are William S. Siflin, *Towards the Comparative Study of Public 4dmimstraiio,* (Bloomington, U.S.A., 1957): Fred W. Riggs, *Ecology ol Public Administration* (Bombay, 1962) and Ferrel Heady and Sybil L gs, *Ecology of Public Administration* (Bombay, *Administration* (Michigan, Ann Arbor, Stokes *(ed.), Papers in Comparative Public*
20. Fred. W. Riggs, "Agraria and Indus 1962).

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absent, in contrast with the refracted society which has a high degree of structural differentiation. The transitional societies are in-between the two, neither totally refracted nor totally fused.

The three types of administrative systems found in these societies differ in three aspects: degree of formalism, degree of homogeneity and degree of overlapping. The fused and refracted administrations are least formalistic because the administrative structure is to a large extent effective. The fused system is able to enf&ce to a large degree its traditional legal code. The refracted system also approximates in practice its formal constitutional and legal model. The prismatic system, however, is marked for high degree of formalism and lack of realism as the constitutional and legal models which are on the statute do not effectively govern the practice. In the prisma society a high degree of formalism penetrates the total social life.

Cultural homogeneity, again, is characteristic of the fused and refracted societies. The simple primitive fused society is homogenous in its economic, social and cultural patterns. Most of the population lives in a similar rural tribal setting with generally similar occupational systems with common attitudes, values and orientations to life. The refracted society too reflects a high degree of cultural homogeneity.21 On the other hand the prismatic society is marked by heterogeneity in which fused and refracted sub-cultures exist side by side— sometimes accommodating each other and sometimes in sharp conflict.

"Prismatic heterogeneity embraces the geographic urban-rural range, the growing' class and communal differentiation, the rise of counter elites and revolutionary movements, poly-normativism and selectivism in administration, and the prevalence of cleëts, accompanied by both primary and secondary groups."22 In the fused model there is no sharp distinction between different functions to be performed and the structures which perform them. There is perfect super-imposition. In the refracted model the political, economic, religious etc, functions are specialised and specialised structures exist for performing them. However, the prismatic system is characterised by overlapping of functions as well as structures. A religious organisation may be performing political as well as economic functions, although separate political and economic structures may be in existence. In fact, a very cleav differentiation of functions may not exist *in* prismatic societies as it exists in the refracted model, Perfect perimposition of functions present in fused model may also be absent.23

21. *Ecology of Public Administration, op. cit., p.* 119.
22.. *Ibid.,* pp. 127-128.
23. *Ibid.,,* pp. 128-129.

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Similarities between the two theoretical models of Almond and Riggs re striking. Both the models are expansive enough to include the modern and the traditional. Both focus on the transitional character of the developing societies. Incongruence between the political culture and the political structure, a characteristic of the

transitional socfet'es as noted by Almond., is also noted by Riggs who terms it high formalism: Both models note the heterogeneous character of transitional societies which have, significant implications for their polities and administration. Both models also agree that transitional societies have neitler highly differentiated nor completely undifferentiated structures which again influence the nature and quality of political and administrative activity.

II

Political Change in Pakistan

Pakistan 'emerged from the struggle of the Muslim League to carve out a home land for the Muslims of India. From an organisation led and controlled by the peak of Muslim aristocracy articulating political interest of an urban. upper class it gradually developed into a mass movement under a charismatic leader. This movement had a highly diffuse orientätklfl and even in the hey-day of its popularity, most of its leadership was recruited from the landed aristocracy and newly emerging professional, commercial and industrial interests, especially the lawyers.24

The 'potential disharmony and conflict of interests in different strata of society was submerged under the strong desire for Muslim self identification. This desire even bridged a wider chasm between the westernised modern educated elite and the eonsertiative ulema who -although played a secondary role in the movement, ensured for it the popular support among the religiously oriented masses.

The sense of urgency and emergency which emerged from the serious problem of existence which Pakistan faced at the time of her creation postponed the precipitation of hidden conflicts for the first few years. However, with the death of two leaders of national stature and a reltive relaxation in the threatful situation, the regional, class, parochial and cultural interests started penetrating the polity. The geographical discontiitiity of the two wings of the country, the stafic and primitive charaóter of the agricultural economy, the predominant rural component

24. Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Pakistan — the ha **rinative** Phase* (Karachi, 1962), pp. 223-224, see also Myron Wiener, "South Asia" in **Almond** and Coleman, *op. cit.,* 209.

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of population, an absence of a national language, a low literacy standard, a wide variation in interwing and intrawing cultural characteristics, problems of integration of Islamic traditions with modern political theories and practices, were significant aspects of the ecological framework in which the new state was destined to function and which pushed the inner schism to rather unmanageable proportions.

The political culture inherited by the new state being fragmented and un-integrated, and with strong subject and parochial orientation which it had evolved under feudal and colonial tradition was hardly congruent with the parliamentary democracy, the constitutional model to which it owed allegiajice. Almost no associational interest groups existed. The general rural mases were inarticulate. No peasant organisation worth the name existed in the country. The non-associational interest articulation by the landed aristocracy was of a particularistic type. The institutional interest groups and U' particular the Bureaucracy grew stronger and stronger and the anomie interest articulation among the loosely integrated urban population and the students became more frequent. The boundary between the polity and society became thinner and thinner with pasage of time.

Naturally, in such a situation the interest aggregation process became difficult. The dominate pol1ticl party which led to the creation **of** Pakistan crumbled under the weight of its own internal schism. No rival political party with national backing emerged. Th.ghly parochial and particularistc orientations of the political paiies and their narrow base made any stable coalition at national and provincial levels impossible. A **a** result, the institutional groups more and more assumed the function of interest aggregation.

The different role incumbents as well as sub-systems of the polity were socialized into contra clictory and even antagonistic orientations and attitu4es. A majority of the

members of legislatures, both provincial and national, came from the landed aristocracy. Most of them Were conservative and resisted any significant change in the socio-economic set-up. Their interest in polity was particularistic, i.e. extracfng pçrsonal favours from bureaucracy and the political elite. Their own power was rooted in tradition, economic power and their non-associational linkage with the rural masses. The family and power structure in which they were socialized also committed them to authoritarian values and attitudes.

Among the urban political elite only the lawyers have internalised rms of democracy. Their commitment to the rule of law grew out ti nature of their profession. The commercial and industrial elite's with the polity emerged out of a sense of insecurity which they

had about their newly amassed wealth. Moreover, democracy and rule of law provided a safeguard against the anomie interest articulation which would have been dangerous to the growth of industry and commerce.

Among the institutional groups the elite of bureaucracy which was recruited from the upper middle class having western education, had developed a pride in the tradition of guardianship, etlic:ency and neutrality which the Indian Civil Service had left. It was suspicious of the input or the political sectors which it presumed to be less virtuous and less competent to protect the interest of the polity.25 While as a part of the westernised class, it was committed to the western democratic system arid to the idea of a neutral bureaucracy it could not be unconcerned with the decrease in its power with increased maturity of the input processes. The judiciary had a high commitment to a democratic polity and was willing to play a neutral role as long as the crcumstances permitted. The military also stuck to its neutral role and stubbornly resisted temptation, to become the arbiter of the political process for nearly twelve years.

The mass of the citizenry, however, was spread over tiny isolated, remote villages. The primary groups of family, kinships and castes socialised them into accepting a diffuse authority of lather, of religious leiders, of village leaders, and of government servant. They were only dimly aware of the existence of central authority and had low congnitive orientation towards it26 They believed themselves only to be recepients of the orders and charities from government. No specific input structure for formulating and transmitting the demands and claims of the masses existed, nor were the masses cognitively oriented toward such an arrangement.

The feudal structure being intact in West Pakistan, the rural masses were far less mobilised in this wing than in the East Wing. The power of the landlord, who was the major contact point between bureaucracy and the rural masses, remained intact and in fact was further fortified, at least Initially, by the introduction of adult franehise.27 The spread of educational facilities in the villages, an increasing impact of

25. Ralph Braibanti "Civil Service of Pakistan—A Theoreticsl Analysis" *South Atlantk Quarterly,* Vol.. LVII. No. 2, 1959, reprinted in Inayatullah (ed.) *Bureaucracy and Development in Pakistan* (Peshawar, 1963) and Khalid Bin Sayeed, *op. cit.*
26. Social Science Research Centre, *Life in Six Vilixiges of Lalwre: Selected Political Aspects* (Lahore 1960).
27. Ia Stephens, *Pakistan* (London, 1963) and Inayattillah, 'Democracy in Rural Communities *nf* Pakistan" *Sociologus,* Vol. IX, N. 1, Berlin, 1959.

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national and international economies on the village economy, which helped the peasant to improve his conditions, implementation of community development program, increased contact between urban and rural sectors, however, were factors encouraging change in. the traditional power structure. In East Pakistan where feudalism had been liquidated earlier and the rural power structure was relatively more fluid, the rural masses were relatively less isolated from national politics. The village students studying in universities and colleges became the carriers of a new political consciousness to the village and a contact point between urban centered

political parties and rural masses. Here was an input structure in the making. However, concentration of political power in the more radical and aggressive student community gave an anomie character to East Pakistan politics.

Political communications in Pakistan remained fragmented, diffused, and parochial. The mass communications media were not effective in reaching the masses. The political parties, having limited recruitment from the rural sector, could hardly function, as a Medium of political communication. Whatever political communication there was from the output structure to the village, was transmitted through the bureaucracy. The newspapers, radio and political rallies all fed the urban centres.. A communications gap existed between the illiterate masses and the national political elite.

The rule making functions were not always performed by the popularly elected legislatures. In the absence of well organised political parties, associational interest groups and vigilant public opinion and in the presence of particularistic orientation of members, any government in power was usually able to carry the ma1ority with it. This subordinated the legislative structure to the executive authority. The legislatures were frequently suspended and dissolved and, as a result the automous rule-making structure remained weak.28 The executive and bureaucracy trespassed their jurisdictional boundaries many times s'grilfying a poor boundary maintenance process between the two. The judiciary in Pakistan was able to preserve its independence by pursuing a vigilant and politically neutral role which it carefully defined for itself. In fact it is the judiciary which has been struggling to protect the rights of the individual and democratic values which in the absence of an effective input structure and weak legislatures were exposed to serious dangers.

Efforts have been made to determine relationship between political development and other socio-economic variables. Lipset has

28.	Kieth Callard. *Pakistan — A Political Study* (London, 1957); Khalid Bin Saeed, *op. cit.,* and Mushtaq Ahmad, *Government and Politics in Pakistan* (Karachi, 1963).

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suggested the possibility of a strong relationship between economic development and political development.29 Coleman has found this relationship generally frue.30 It is suggested that the countries with higher level of economic development tend to have more competitive (democratic) political systems. According to Coleman, Pakistan is thirtieth in its rank order of economic development among forty Six African and Asian countries and its political system tends to be non-competitive {1958-62), in accordance with its level of economic development.31 C'utright has established a close relationship between communications development and political development and has calculated whether a country's political development was lower, higher or equal to its predicted level of political development on the basis of its communication development.32 According to this study Pakistan's political development was higher than its predicted political development.

The weakness of these studies is that they tend to establish relationships at a given time. For instance, Coleman has categorised Pakistan as authoritarian because the constitutioni framework was suspended during 1958-61. But his analysis ignores the fact that its political system was competitive from 1947 to 1958 and from 196f onward. Cutright's analyss, however, takes into account both communications development and political development over-time. His conclusion about Pakistan is suggestive of the fact that its communicatlv level would support a more competitive system if Pakistan further moves in that direction.

The political system adopted by Pakistan since its creation was the British type of parliamentary democracy. Thperience of the elite in finning such a system dates from 1921 when, In a restricted form paflia. mentary democracy was introduced in India. Its scope was expanded in ll53 Act. But its effective operation was hampered by the break-out of the Second World War and later political turmoil. Therefore it cannot be said that it had taken root in political soils of the sub-continent.

In Pakistan from the very beginning the political practice departed from the parliamentary model. The overwhelming charismatic leader. whose devotion to the cause of Pakistan gave him unlimifed authority,

29. Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development ant Political Legitimacy," *American Political Sciegce Review.* 53 (March, 19591, pp. 69-103.
30. Almond and Coleman, *op. cit., pp.* 538-544.
31. *Ibid.,* p. 542.
32. Philips Cutright, "National Development: Measurement and Analysis," *American Sociological Review,* Vol. 28, No. *2,* pp. 253-264.

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could not be expected to wear the strictly constitutional garb of Governo1 General and to leave the political decisions entirely to the formal parliamentary leader—that is, the prime minister.33 After the death of the Quaid-i-Azam, the practices approximated more closely to the model because the Prime Minister was the trusted lieutenant of the Quaid. After the death of Liaquat Au Khan, however, the model became increasingly irrelevant to political practices and a high degree of formalism precipitated. I he political culture in the society had high subject and parochial oiientations while the structure was one which suited only a participant political culture. This continued incongruence between the political structure and political culture and the heightening formalism expressed itself in the form of a state of disequilibrium in the polity.

This could have been rectified either by i) removing the incongruent structure and reverting to a level at par with political practice or ii) changing the political culture in a way that it could support the strueture. Pakistan adopted the first alternative. Since then, however, governmental structure, more akin to existing socio-cultural conditions, is being experimented with the expectation that as the polity develops necessary participative structures and political orientation, the system would gradually adjust itself.

Administrative Change in Pakistan

A polity involved in solving fundamental problems of integration of sub-cultures in its fold could hardly be an instrument for bringing about major changes in the bureaucracy. When problems of existence and consolidation loom large in the mind of a nation, it could be hardly expected to take the risk of experimenting with new organisations. If the consolidation loom large in the mind of a nation, it could be hardly with the past and was proud of its colonial heritage is accepted, the absence of any major move to break with the colonial heritage in Pakistan becomes easier to understand.34

The present structure of public adminitration in Pakistan was evolved during the British rule in India. Inspite of several efforts at

33. Khalid Bin *Saned, op.* cit.
34. For a dcence of the colonial bureaucratic heritage by senior governmtnt servants see S. Fida Hussain, "Background of Public Administration in Pakistan and Our Present Requitemeuts" in M. K Inayat (ad.) *Perspective in Publ& Administration* (Civil Service Academy, Lahore, 1962), pp. 76-87; G. Ahmad, "Changes in the Administrative Organisation of Government of Pakistan since 1953" in Inayatullah (ed), *Bw-eaucracy and Development, op.* cit., pp. 154-155 and Agha Abdul Hamid, **Emerging** *1.k* **of** the *Administrator in Pakistan* (NIPA, Lahore, publication (3) Lahore, 1963).

reorientating the system, it maintains its pre-independence character. There is no fundamental change in the service structure, departmental organisation, the division of authority among different levels of administration, the relationship between secretariat and field organisation, or the character of the district administration. The

addition of a new responsibility of developing the society has no doubt enlarged its scope but has not substantially modified its structure.

While the administrative structure has maintained continuity with the past the framework in which the administration has been functioning has substantially changed. The immunity from political pressures which the British bureaucracy enjoyed can no longer be claimed by the present bureaucracy. Locus of authority which was formerly in the British Parliament has now shifted to the national sovereign instituflons accompanied by an insistence that administration is to serve and not to rule the people. With changes in the socio-economc structure, increasing urbanisation, increase in the level of literacy and a rise in political consciousness, the bases for guardianship of bureaucracy are being eroded. The symbols which kept the bureaucracy apart from the society are no longer its monopoly. Higher education, command over the English language, western education and exclusive clubs do not re-inforce the bureaucratic authority to the extent which they did before Independence. A national commitment to modernise the economy and polity also necessitated the addition of new skills and competence in bureaucracy which increased the value of specialisation with a consequent challenge to the leadership of the generalist, leading to intra-bureaucratic tensions. It also required the bureaucracy to develop new relationship with the general masses, inculcate a new image of the people and substitute a positive attitude towards the input structure of the polity for the previous distrust of the 'politics.'

The major challenge and major problem of public administration in Pakistan is seeking congruence between the administrative heritage from the colonial era and the new framework in which it has to operate. This problem is less serious for the higher level of administration which is relatively more modernised and less incompatible with its surroundings than at the lower level where bureaucracy and the masses of the people meet, that is, at the district level. To operate the traditional structure in changing framework require adaptive structures. Historically local government has functioned as an adaptive structure which has helped to provide a 'democratic facade to an autocratic structure'. How this adaptive mechanism was evolved, how it operated before and after independence and how far it might be able

to change the character of district administration are questions to which we turn in the next chapter.

Chapter **II**

EVOLUTION OF DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN WEST PAKISTAN

Character of District Administration

The district was the most vital unit of administration in Pakistan before Independence and continued to be alter Independence was gained. The policies framed at the central and provincial secretariat are implemented through the agency of district administration. Vital decisions about law and 'order as well as extension of social services to the people are eventually taken by the district administration. The general public forms the image of the government from the character and the activities of the district administration.

Evolving through history district administration has developed a character of its own—a character which fixes its own stamp on the execution and implementation of ideologies, policies and program **of** any regime at national level. More than the ideological nature of governments at the national level, democratic or authoritarian, it is the nature of the relationship between the district bureaucracy and the common citizenry which determines the concrete relationship between the ruling elite, bureaucracy, and the masses.

District administration is not only a territorial sub-division of an administrative area but also a system of administration with Ils peculiar characteristics. As such it is a product of British administrative genius and craftsmanship and was evolved in former British colonies during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in response to various social and political challenges which the British colonialism faced in consolidation **of** its hold.

In India when district administration was in its formative stage, there were two schools of thought about the extent of authority of the district officer—the Cornawalis school which favoured the separation of powers in district administration and the Munro school which supported mncentration and combination of power.l The experience of 1857,

1. Haridwar Rai, "Changing Role of District Officei-, (1860-1960)", *I,dian Journal of Public Administration,* **Vol IX, No. 2, pp.** 238- 239.

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however, demonstrated the validity of the Munro school's thinking **that** separation **of** power would dangerously weaken the district administration's power to retain its alien hold over a restless Population. The controversy never raised its head again. The development of the edifice of district administration hinged over this pivotal principle.

Administrative machinery *for* the performance **of the three** essential functions, that is maintenance of law and order, collection of taxes and administration of justice, which was the responsibility of the State in the early nineteenth century, was placed under one functionary known by various titles as collector, district magistrate and deputy commissioner. Later, as the scope of governmental activities expanded in such spheres, as education, health, and agriculture, etc, 'the representatives of these departments appeared at the district also, While generally the new departments were technically independeflt from the district officer's control an indetermrnate authority of district officer over t.beni for horizontal coordination was always reçognised.2 In the late nieteenth century, when in6titu.tions of local government were introduced, their proper functioning also became part of the district officer's responsibility. After Independence, the shadow of his formal and informal authority loomed large over the community development programs as well 'as fledgling voluntary org anization.3

By district administration is, therefore, understood all government agencies which are operating in the territory of a district, including the complex of relationship in which the functionaries of these agencies and the clientele of the administration, that is, the people, are enmeshed.4 As the totality of these relationships persisted over a period of nearly two centuries, they constituted and together determined the character of the district administration.

As earlier noted, the district administration operated on the princip'l& of combination and concentration of power. The repository of these powers was, and is, a generalist belonging generally to 'the administrative elite of the country — a fact which further re-inforces **his**

2. *IbU.,* pp. 240-241.
3. About the evolution *of* district adminis tration, see the following: Philip Woodruf, **Th Men who** *Ruled India.* **The** *Guard'a,r.s* (New York, 1954); A. II. **Aslam, Deputy** *Commi-ssione.r'* (Punjab Univvsity, Iahore, 1957); S.S. Khera, **District Administration** *ut* hula (New Delhi, 1964); **R.W.** Gable, **An Introduction to District Administration** (Lahor; 1963); Mimeo and Haridwar Rai, **op. cit.**
4. S.S. Khera, **op.** *clt.,* pp. 1-12. 16

authority.5 For exercise of his vast array of powers, before Independence, he was accountable to none but own conscience immediately and to the Secretary of State remotely. Even after tndependenee his accountability for use of, these powers was limited to his own superiors. His relationship with the technical departments was and is that of a superior who directs their activities through the force of combined legal as well as extra-legal authority. His membership iix the administrative elite, and his position as representative of the central and provincial governments in the district, his higher salary and other facilities exclusively available to' hint ensured his control over them. Relationships of district administration especially those of district officer, with the masses were based on the assumption that the administration was there to protect the interest of the subject who was presumably incapable of protecting its

own interest.6 This guardianship of the' district officer, extended even to the local government institutions which were presumably created' with the avowed purpose of political education of the masses.

Combination of several powers, lack of local accountability, a position of superior over technical departments, and control over local government by the deputy commissioner made the character of the ;district administration that of an autocracy. In this system the bureaucracy assumed the function of interest articulation and interest [aggregation and to an extent controlled political communications. The interest groups in the society, being generally non-associatonal, and with olitiea1 parties ineffective, there did not exist an autonomous input stiucture. Combination of rule application and rule adjudication functron in the same structure made it an undifferentiated governmental structure, while 'the combination of governmental and political functions made it a 'political system par excellence.

That the character of district administration was authoritarian has never been disputed. Philip Woodru (himself an I'CS) said:

It was a despotism tempered by the despot's liberal upbringing and by knowledge of Parliament's usually liberal attitude. But despotism it was ail the same as any system must be in which people are given what is good for them instead of what they want.7

5.. See Ralpb Braibanti, "Civil Service of Pakistan - A Theoretical Analysis", reprinted in yatullah (ed.), **Bureaucracy and Development in Pakistan** (Peshawar, 163) and rd W. Gable, **op. cit.,** and A. H. Aslam, **op. cit.**

6. Ralph Braibanti, **op. cit., p.** 195.

7. **Woodruf, op.** cit., **p.** 17.

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That this character of district administration persisted even after Independence without any substantial change has been noted by otherS.8 This character of the district administration was the product of the historic situation and was in harmony

with the contemporary sock)c tutal condition. The district administrator could not be made accountable for his political and administrative decisions to the local population whose interests he was supposed to safeguard. It would not have been feasible because the political authority from which he derived his absolute power was not rooted iP the consent of the people. In the Indian sub-continent absolute personal rule was the dominant political dispensation throughout most of its history. The masses looked upon tbe government and State with fear and awe and never expected nor struggled for an administration responsible to them. At the best they wanted a benevolent agency which would intervene when oppression of the dominant classes in society became *beyond* toleration. Differentiation of judicial and executive roles could not be functional in an administrative system which was not sure of its own roots and was functioning in a non- pluralistic folk society.

II

Local Government and District Administration till Independence

By the last quarter of the nineteenth century the authoritarian character of district administration had fully developed. As a result the limited local autonomy available to the village and the informal exeoutive-cum--judicial body — the well known panchayat, wherever it existed, had been subverted.9 The establishment of district courts, district police and the emergence of a district revenue hierarchy deprived the village of self-dependence and encouraged dependence on paternal district administration. The new laws and procedures of administration displayed high formalism, encouraged litigation, and consequent factionalism.10

The realisation that this state of affairs was dangerous for rural peace and order and that the emerging western educated class needed to be absorbed and trained to run representative institutions before it rallied

8. Bernavd L Gladieux, "Reorientation of Pakistan Government *for* National Development" — a Report submitted to Planning Board, Government of Pakistan, in May, 1953 and Khalid Bin Saeed, *Pakistan — the Formatâ'e Phase* (Karachi, 1960).

9. Hugh Tinker, *Foundations of Local Self.Govenunent in India, Pakistan and Burma* **(London,** 1954), pp. 32-33 and Percival Spears, *Twilight of the Mughals* (Cambridge, 1951), pp. 102-114.

10. Percival Spears, *ibid.*

19

around future radical ideologies, led the British in India to introduce the local government. It first started with cities partly inhabited by the British themselves. Later it was extended to the other cities and rural areas. Consequently in areas which came under the British rule later, evolution of local government was slower.

The first resolution of significance about local government was introduced in 1854 which started with a note of acknowledgment **of the** fact that 'the people of this country (India) are perfectlY **capshle d.** administering their own local affairs."ll However, the local bodies treated under this resolution were largely nominated.l2 The most signil cant resolution, however, came in 1882 which till 1959 remained the base of all later local government enactments. This resolution generally known as "Ripon's Resolution of Local Self-Government" forthrightly enunclated that the primary purpose of local government which was to be established was political education of the masses and that this purpose had to be achieved inspite of initial sacrifices in administrative efflciency.13 It also emphasised the revitalisation and extension of indigenous local I government, that is panchayat, and laid down that:

a) Besides district and municipal boards, the boards may be created at tehsilftaluqa/sub-division level.

b) All boards should contain two-thirds non-official elected majority wherever possible; and

c) The chairmen of boards should be elected wherever possible.

In consonance with the requirements of this Resolution the Punjab Government passed its Punjab District Board .ct of 1883. **Under** this Act it was obligatory on the provincial government to create district boards and optional to establish tehsil

boards. Two thirds of the members had to be non-official and not less than half of the members were required to be land-owners. In 1884 Punjab had its Municipal Act with a similar stipulation about the membership as the District Board Act, but it left the question of election or nomination of the chairman optional on the Conmüttees.14

11. Hugh Tinker, *op. cit., p.* 36. In 1963 when nearly a hundred years had passed, **tbi** statement by a colonial power presents a sharp contrast with *more* possitmatic, though PossIbly mo realistic, asSesasnsst of people's capacities for self-government in times.

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.,* p 44. –

14. *Ibid.*

20

The Ripons Resolution *no doubt laid* the foundation of modern local government in India. But its implementation fell far short of its high ideals. The paternal British bureaucracy was not willing to enthusiastically support a resolution which curtailed its complete power over people.15 The provision about non-official chairmanship of district boards was generally ignored.16 The nominated members could not consider themselves as partner in administration with an agency which had nominated them. The electoral base of elected members being extremely limited, they also did not show much political enthusiasm. • "District boards were at best little more than petty departments of the district administration.17 The reforms failed in almost every phaseJ8 The relationship between district autocracy and subject masses was one of alienated apathy.

Investigations of the Royal Decentralisation Commission (1907-1909) showed that in twenty years after Ripon's Resolution, local • government made no headway. "It was still in many ways a democratic facade to an autocratic structure. The actual conduct of business was carried on by district officials with the non-official members as spectators or at most critics. No proper system of local affairs has evolved "19 Participation of the local leadership was almost negligible. Big landlords were

indifferent to local government. Those who became members did not show much interest in it, first because they were ill-acquainted with the English and secondly because they "desired to stand well with government so as to retain their privileges."20 The mass of peasants and the depressed classes were not represented at local bodies.21

The Royal Decentralisation 'Commission's recommendations fcr re-invigoraton of local government included election of non-official chairmen for urban bodies, universal establishment of tehsil boards, strengthening of the financial position of district boards, acceptance of district officer as constitutional heads of district boards and the establishment of rural panchayats.22

15. *Ibid.,* **pp.** 43-44.
16. *Ibid.,* p. 46.
17. *lbL'd.,* p. 54.
18. *Ibid.,* p. 57.
19. *Ibid.,* **p.** 70.
20. Ibid., p. 79.
21. *Ibid.,* p. 79.
22. *Ibid.,* pp. 85.87.

The recommendation about district officer 'becoming chairman of district board was only a confirmation of the existing practice. Except this, other recommendations Were not implemented.

In 1915 Lord Hardinge got another resolution passed re-affirming the common principles embodied in Ripon's Resolution and the recommendation of the Decentralisation Commission. The only advancement this 'hopelessly outdated' resolution made on those which had been made before was the suggestion that provincial governments should experiment with non-official chairmen in selected

district boards. Inspite of this however, 'the old hierarchy of control remained intact.'23 –

The Montague Chelmsford Report of 1918, dealt with local government in addition to constitutional matters. It ac&pted the policy of political education through local government and made the following recommendations:

a) The proportion of elected members in the local bodies may be raised to 3/4 rather than 2/3 as recommended by Ripon's Resohtion.

b) It confirmed the recommendation of Ripon's Resolution and Hardinge's Resolution about the non-official elected chairman of local bodies.

c) The panchayat, it emphasised, should not be integrated with district boards and a portion of land revenue css to be given to the boards may be shared by panchayats.

Another significant change for local government which the Monague Chelmsford Report contained was the establishment of a diarchy under which local government became a transferred subject to be administered by an Indian minister. This change was followed by a series of enactments in the field of local government. The Punjab Town Improvement Act of 1922, the Punjab Small Town Cdmmittee Act, 1922, Panchayat Act of 1921 and Municipal Executive Officers Act of 1931 were passed in the Puujab. The N.W.F.P. had its Municipal Committee Act in 192& The Sind Acts, VLL of 1938 and **X** of 1940, were enacted, the former abolishing the nominations of local bodies and the latter inaugurating joint electorates in borough municipalities.

23. *ibid.,* **p. 101**

The transfer of control of local government from British bureaucracy to Indian leadership had salutary effects in the beginnng. The principle that political education comes through trial and error was recognised.24 There was less and less interference in the affairs of local bodies from the government side. In the forties, while in the Pun jab there was a progressive trend towards having more and more

non-otncial

V chairmen, Sind and N W F P had completely politicised these positions and the two smaller provinces had stolen the march over the Punjáb. Although all the three provinces gave the respective provincial governments the power to supercede the local bodies this power was exercised sparingly and with caution except in NWFP.

That the governments of the three provinces did not supercede many local bodies on the basis of inefficiency did not mean that they were functioning to their satisfaction. The Report on the working of Municipalities in Punjab of 193a-39 noted:

It must be regretfully admitted that in the year under report no appreciable improvement in municipal administration has been **V** achieved. The years record is a repetition of the same old depressing sfàry of -party faction, nepotism and lack of civic responsibility. The members lack public spirit and are chiefly actuated by personal motives wfth the result that public interests suffer.25

The administration of district boards in the Punjab was reported to be better than its municipalities. The evils of corruption, nepotism, inefficiency, though found here also, were not allowed to go too far because of the existence of official chairman. However, a common failure mentioned throughout in government reports was the inability of the boards to realise the professional tax and the property tax. Administration of the boards in N W F P as well as in Sind shared the weaknesses of the Punjab boards.

During this period the Sind Government appointed a committee which reviewed the conditions of local bodies and made the following recommendations for their improvement:

a) In View of the poor financial conditions the committee advised levying of new taxes, giving ten per cent of the land revenue to local bodies and imposition of special cess.

24. Azim Husaaiu, *Fazl-i-Hussain* (Bombay, J946), p. 13Q, quoted in *Foundatk of Local Sell. Government in Indla, Pakistan and **Burma,** op. cit.*

25. Government of Punjab, *Municipalities in Pun jab 1938-39* (Lahore, 1940>.

23

b) It specified that a minimum percentage of total expenditure of the local bodies should be spent on education, public health and public works.

c) Every district board and borough municipality should **have** a chief officer. The key posts of local bodies should be placed under the Previincial Public Service Commission.

d) The local bodies should be taken from the control of. the collector and the commissioner, and placed under a commissioner of local government.

e) To democratise the exercise of control over local bodies by the proposed commissioner, creation of a board to be called local self-government board consisting of official and non-offiaai members was suggested.26

Before the Dyarchy rule, local government was an appendage to district administration thus enhancing the power and prestige of the district officer. Functioning either under the direct chairmanship of the district officer or under his supervision, with a significant portion of the members owing their seats to the district officer's pleasure and the remaining members always outdoing each other to go along with him, the local government did not in any way constitute a threat to the authoritarian rule of the district officer. Dyarchy rule in provincial government, however, brought this type of rule, though in diluted form, down to the district also. With penetration of local bodies, especially large municipalities, by nationalistic elements who took directions from political parties, and the emergence of elected majorities jn local bodies with non-official chairmen as heads and Indian ministers as ultimate bosses, local government was emerging as a rival structure' to district administration. However, powers and authority of the local government being limited to narrow field of activities and with the district officers' supervisory and suspensory powers over local government still Intact, local government did not constitute an immediate threat. Bu further steps might take a different turn. That district officers should be relieved of their control over local government had been recommended by the Sind Committee which had also noted the district officers' disgust with local

bodies due to waning of their authority over them.27 Looking forward to 1947 one could probably anticipate a strengthening of this trend in future when the sub-continent had won its freedom and the people could be trusted with more local autonomy in administration under democratic regimes.

26. Government of Sind, *Report of the Local Governvnent Reform Comrnttee* (Hyderabad, 1944).
27. *Ibid.,* p. 53.

24

Local Government and District 'Adininistration From .1947-58

The newly created state of Pakistan faced problems of unusual magnitude as a result of partition of Ihdia. Therefore, local government, instead of claiming the special interest of government and the people, could hardly maintain the level of its previous operation. The large scale exodus and inflow of people whose major concern was finding food and shelter created a situation in which little heed could be paid to the reorganisation of local government. Central government was to be created out of nothing. Economic problems of immense magnitude were 'to be tackled.

Independence, however, provided a new framework for local gov.ernmerit, since the principle of popular sovereignty had been accepted. Implications of this change for local government were recognised in the manifesto of the Muslim League which said.—

In principle the Muslim League stands for the very widest éxteitsion of local self-government on the model of the parishes and communes of the United States. It is not logical or posaible to have democracy at the apex sustained b bureaucracy at the base; and in fact democracy should be most extensive where it conies closest in touch witH the ordinary life of the common man. In practice this implies that we must train our people for local self-government in all directions so that the decisions which

are now bureaucratically taken and executed by Deputy Commissioners and Superintendents of Police should be arrived at and taken responsibility for by the elected representatives of the people.28

This spirit gradually started penetrating the policies about local government. Firstly, adult franchise was introduced in local government which broadened its popular base. Secondly, the practice of nominating some members t.o the boards and committees, prevalent in Punjab, was abolished. Thirdly, the post of chairman was thrown open for election even in Punjab. All these steps were of great significance for making local government more democratic and autonomous from bureaucratic tutelage. Widespread reconstitution of local bodies was also effected. However, local government was losing ground in other respects. NWFP Gàvernment took away primary education and public health from the local bodies. In the Punjab the school teachers

28. Quoted in Local Government Reforms Committee, *First Interim Report* (1953, Lahore), p. **13.**

25

demanded complete provincialisation of education and just before the imposition of Martial Law in 1958 the Teachers' Association had gives an ultimatum to the government to go on strike, if the schools remained under the control of local bodies.

The realisation that local government has to play an important role in the political life of the nation, stimulated fresh thinking on ti structure and functions of local government in Pakistan. The Punjab Government appointed a Local Government Reform Committee in 1950 to suggest improvement in the structure of local government in Punjab.29 The Committee submitted an interim report3o which made the following recommendations:

a) There should be a federal structure of local **government** including both rural and urban bodies with the district council constituting the central federal agency.

b) The 'corporations' which were recommended for Lahore only, and 'city councils' for cities with populations in excess **of** one lakh should be autonomous bodies and should not be federated into the general system.

c) There should be a uniformity of nomenclature of the local bodies. All should be called councils.

d) A village council should be set up in a village or a group **of** villages with a population of not less than 2000 and not more than 10,000.

e) The municipal council of towns and village councils should have autonomy in some functions but shouk **be under the** control of district councils for others.

f). The executive officer system should be abolished. The **cabinet** system may be introduced in district boards and corporations.

g) The control of provincial government should be exercised through a local government board.

The Government of Sind appointed a similar committee in 1953.31 This Committee agreed with most of the recommendations of the Punjab Committee except that it did not favour the cabinet system **of**

29. Notification No. 7011-B and C-50/40548, dated lst Auguot, 1950

30.. Local Government Reform Committee, *First Interim Report* (Lahore, 1951).

31. Government of Sind, *Report of the Local Self Government* Committee (Hyderabad, 1954).

administration for local bodies. After the two committees, significant contributions were made by the Local Governmert Seminar of 1956 organised by the West Pakistan Government.

The various groups constituted for discussion in the Seminar submitted their recommendations not all of which were accepted. However, there was a general consensus for making local bodies more democratic and reducing the control of the deputy commissioner and commissioner over them. As suggested by earlier

committees the creation of a post of commissioner of local government and local self government board was also favoured. There was controversy about the size of area for a panchayat, about integration of rural and urban bodies and retention of the executive officer system.32

The dominant strand in the thinking on local government upto the Local Government Seminar of 156, was the making of local government more autonomous from official control and making the exercise of such control more democratic. This point of view, however, was more popular with the non-official circles while the bureaucrats found their power over local bodies inadequate and wanted more power to ensure their proper fuctioning.33

In practice, however, local government Was subjected to serious hardships. The supersession of local bodies on the excuse of inefficiency became far more frequent. The political parties in power at the provincial level made it a point to capture the local bodies by bringing their supporters into power and superceding those bodies where they could not impose their will. Once a body was superceded, it continued to be administered by an officially appointed administrator or indefinite periods. The situation was relatively worse in the Frontier Province where by 1951-52, all the six district boards and the nine municipal committees stood superceded34 and administered by government appointed adniinistrators.35 These bodies were not reelected until elections were held under the Basic Democracies system.

When the elections were held for some local bodies the party in power resorted to election maipractices of extreme type.S6 The more

32. Government of West Pakistan, *Proceedings of the Local Government Seminar* (Lahore, 1957).
33. *Ibid.*
34. They in fact stood supercedë since 1943.
35. Government of North-West Frontier Province, *Administration Report on the Working oj District Boards its the North West Frontier Province for Year 1951-52* (Peshawar 953) and *Annual Report on the Working of Municipalities and Notified Area Committees in the NWFP for the Year 1951-52* (Pëshawar, 1953).

36. See A.M. Khan Leghari, *Report on the Sargodha District Board Eiectios 1952-53* (Lahore. 1955).

26

powerful and influential candidates bribed the lower government <u>officials</u> in their favour. The practice of casting bogus votes was rampant.37 There were indications that in many municipalities and district boards the relationship between elected chairmen, and the government appointed secretaries or executive officers was not smooth. The executive officer viewing his role as that of a watch dog of administration found the chairman's authority itself an evil influence. The chairman on the other hand found that although he had the public will lehind him, the executive officers were reluctant to accept his authority. The chronic diseases **of** local government in the sub-continent like reluctance to levy taxes, failure to check leakage of octroi and ineffectiveness of the machinery to collect taxes, still persisted.

After the integration of several provinces of West Pakistan into a single province, local bodies continued to be governed by the enactment under which they functioned before integration except in the case of Bahawalpur State where Punab Local Government Laws were introduced. There were proposals for unification of local government laws, provincialisation of key posts in local bodies, and establishment of local government colleges. But none of these were implemented.

The dyarchy in the district administration which had been established since 1921 got further consolidated after Independence. Local government became more and more democratic at least in form. The control of the district officer on the local government became weak. He no longer had the authority to nominate members to locai bodies. His mode of exercise of control over local government was being criticised e'.en in official circles.38 The public representatives wanted to completely eliminate his control and called the section concerning district officer's powers as a 'black mark'.39 The newly emerging professional groups in urban municipalities were not as much overawed by the mighty district officer as previous groups. Even the landed aristocracy which by then had developed political connections with the provincial

political elite, was more assertive and less timid. Political pressures which emerged as a natural result of Independence, proved corrosive for the district officer's authority on even 'reserved subjects' such as the police, revenue and magistracy. The foundations of two-century-old district administration were shaking.

37. The Wesent riLer 1ad the experience of working as pol1ig agent for a candidate in district Gnjvanwala in Punjab in 1951. These observations are based on those experiences. experiences.
38. Government of Pakistan. Planning Board, *First Five-Year Plan* C1956 Karachi), p. 104.
39. *Proceedings of Seminar, op cit.,* p. 92. See also A.H. Aslam. op. *Cit.,* pp. 45-46.

28

However by 1954, as the initial enthusiasm and fervour for democratic ideals got numbed by political instability and traumatic experiences of two constltutional breakdowns and top bureaucrats ascended into the political saddles the values of the British administrative heritage was rediscovered. The gravity of the threat of political pressures to the efficiency of district administration was realised. One bureaucrat- politician said:

You cannot have the old British system of administration and at the same time allow the politicians to meddle with the civtl services. In the Britsh system the District Magistrate was the king pin of administration. His authority was unquestioned. We have to restore that.40

Implicit in the above statement is the fear that an unfolding of the political process in a society is incompatible with the efficient functioning of district administration and that one can be preserved only at the cost of other.

A cont-ributory factor in generating pressure against the authoritarian character of district administration was the introduction and expansion of the Community Development Program known in Pakistan as V-AID. This program idealised the

masses, created organisations for involving the people in decision-making processes and fnally made a strong onslaught on the fortress of orthodox bureaucracy. It won several disciples and in fact served as a rallying point for the radicals in civil service.41 In bridging the gap between administration and the masses and in changing their 'subject' and parochial' orientations probably V-AID proved more effective than century old local government.

IV

Introduction of Basic Democracies

The system of Basic Democracies was introduced one year after the Revolution of 1q58. The Revolution brought an end to both the nt:onal and provincial parliaments as well as local government institutions. The legitimacy for the Revulution - was sought in the

40. Iskanda Mirza, interior Miniser in 1954 made this statement. **Dawn.** October 31, 1954. quoted in Kieth Callord. *Pakistan—A Political Study* (London, 1958). p. 285.

41. On V-AID see Jack D. Mezirow, *Dynamics of Community Development: **A Case** Study of Pakistan* (Berkley. 1962); Government of Pakistan *First Five-Year Plan* (1956, Karachi) and Government of West Pakistan, *V-AID: Some Article and Reports* (Lahore, 1960) and Jnayatullah, *Development Bureaucracies in Pakistan* in Ralph Braibanti (edi, ***Asian** Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from British Imperial Tradition* (Durham, USA. 1965).

failure of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan as well as malpractices of the politicians. The leaders of the Revolution promised the ultimate restoration of democracy but of a type understandable to and **workable** by people.

At the time of the promulgation of the Basic Democracies Order, President Mohammad Ayub Khan said that with the introduction **of** Basic Democracies,

'democracy has been brought to the door step of the people.'42 The aim of Basic Democracies, according to him, was **'the** direct participation of the people managing their affairs through representative bodies not far removed from their own village and mohalla'.43 Inspite **of** the fact that the President has noted that Basifl Democracies were only **a "base on which** an upward pyramid of a sound political system can be developed,"44 in some quarters the Basic Democracies were regarded as 'a new political system' and a new alternative to parliamentary democracy.45 With the introduction of the constitution in. Il62 which envisaged a presidential system of government for the country, a more realistic evaluation of Basic Democracies emerged and more and more **it** was accepted as a new system of local government rather than 'a new political system."46

As a system of local government, Basic Democracies had several peculiar features which distinguished it from previous systems. In West Pakistan, at least, it had introduced a new tier of local government, the union council. This tier was designed for areas smaller than a district **but** larger than the old panchayat. The union generally included several villages with homogenous ethnic characteristics creating a base for developing wider loyalities among the 'inward looking', parochially -oriented rural people. The taluqa and tehsil boards, envisaged in Ripon's Resolution but never universally established, were also created and called tehsil councils in West and thana councils in East Pakistan. The district council, though a new varient of the district board, was given the broader responsibility of supervising the district administration. The divisional council of course is an innovation. All the four levels of local government are mutually integrated through common membership and ascending authority. This had been

42. Government of Pakistan, *Dawn of New Era* (n.d). p. 33.
43. *Ibid*
44. The Department of Advertising, Films and Publication, Government of Pakistan publishej a speech of the President on Basic Democracies with the title "Towards a New Political System."
45 See several *papers* included in Aziz Beg (ed.), *Gra8s Roots Goverirmen,t* **(Rawalpindi,** 196R
46. See Masihuzzaman, "What j Basic Democracy" in Azlz Beg, *op. cit.*

recommended by the Punjab Sind Committees but, In tact, was never implemented before the Basic Democracies.

A significant change which Basic Democracies brought was the removal of the dyarchy which existed in local government and district administration. The authority and jurisdiction of newly created councils — tehsil councils, district councils, divisional councils, were extended over all activities of the administration from law and order to socioeconomic development — an authority which district boards always lacked.. This was in fact an attempt to create a partnership between the public servant and local leadership and to make the administration responsible to local people.

The system, however, came under criticism for enhancing the control and power of the public servant over local government. Except in the case of union councils, all the councils were headed by public servants. The non-official appointed members were nominated by bireaucracy rather than elected by people. In defence of this it - was said that government servants were needed to lead and guide the people until people were politically mature. Also i(was argued that there was no reason to distrust the authority of the government servant who was being controlled by the national rather than an alien government, and who was himself a patriotic citizen of the country. –

As far as the relationship between the traditional district administration and local government was concerned, the Basic Democracies did not envisage any radical change. There was no attempt to subordinate the bureaucracy to public representatives, although President Ayub set this as an ultimate destiny. Also, - the - creation of completely autonomous units of local government as envisaged in the Muslim League Manifesto did not seem to be the intention.

Local autonomy is not necessarily to be equated with democracy nor does it automatically promote local development.47 On the other hand, Professor Riggs has suggested that local autonomy is a negative factor for political modernisation if this autonomy is used for preserving the status quo.48 The real significance of Basic Democracies lies in its potential for contributing to development by creating an input aspect to the district administration through the

47. George Langord, "Local Government and Democracy", *Public 4dminissaton,* Vol. XXXI, 1957, p. 27.
48. Fred W. Riggs "Economic Development and Local Administration: A Study in Circular Causation", *Philippine Journal of PLLb& Administration,* Vol. 3, No. 1, 1959 pp. 86-14.

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establishment of a structure for articulating and aggregating rural modernising administrative and political elite and in providing an interests, in eliminating the 'communications gap' existing between the organisational framework for promoting socio-economic development.

The character of district administration in Pakistan, as noted earlier, has been paternal and authoritarian. The system of district administration was oriented towards the protection of interests of the masses rather than making them partners in decisions which affected them. In the absence of associational interest groups, it heavily relied on a bureaucratic apparatus for cognition and articulation of problems **of** the people and transmitting the policies and programs of the government back to them. There was no differentiation of political and administrative input and output structures. Efforts were made to provide a dernocratc 'facade to this autocratic structure'- through local government institutions in the past but these efforts failed to modify the essential. character **of** the local administration. It is the hypothesis of this study that Basic Democracies are a potent element of change in the ecology of

district administration which is transforming an authoritarian system into a partly democratic system.

The existence of a 'communications gap' between the modernising elite and the rural masses of developing societies has been noted by several political scientists.49 This gap has operated as a serious limitation on the capacity of the modernising elite to communicate with the masses, with whom they share few values, few symbols, and few aspirations. Lnspite of the hard efforts on the part of rulers, peasants find it difficult to draw out of their rural shells and share the sense of nationhood. Consequently the elite fails to motivate the rural masses to march with them in transforming the antiquated structure of the society. This communications gap could be filled by a bridge of semi-educated, **semi-** modern class of rural leaders who share with the elite and the masses the essential capacity for communicating with the two groups. The second hypothesis of this study, is that the Basic Democracies have organised such a class of leadership in the formal structure of local government and has thereby established a communication link between the two unconnected layers of the Pakistani society.

The paradox of the process of economic development in **newly** developing countries is that along with the emergence of new industries and modern shopping centres in big urban centres, there exists poverty, illiteracy, poor communications and isolation in the non-urban sectors

49. Lucian W. Pye, *Communicaijons and Political Development* (Princeton, 1963).

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of the society. As the contact of rural people with urban centres increases there emerges a spiral of rising aspirations without a corresponding development in the capacity, attitudes, socio-economic and government structures to generate economic power to meet these rising expectations. Community Development and local government structures have been established in different countries to create these necessary characteristics among the rural masses. In Pakistan, while the Community

Development program was terminated in 1961, it left some impact on the rural society. Basic Democracies show greater potentialities for promoting the processes of local development.

What structure for local government have the Basic Democracies created and what functions have been assigned to them will form the ubject of the next chapter.

Chapter III

STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF BASIC DEMOCRACIES

The Basic Democracies Order replaced fifteen existing enactments in the field of local government1 and for the first time provided a uniform pattern of local government in both the wings of Pakistan. The Order established a five tiered system of local government by creating union uncils, tehsil councils, district councils, divisional councils and provincial development advisory councils.2 Only the first four councils were intended to be local councils. The provincial council was an ad hoc arrangement for providing some sort of consultative body to the Martial Law regime and was wound up after the election of the Provincial Legislative As';emblies in 1961.

II

Structure

The lowest division for rural areas, called union, was carved out of an area having a population of 800() on the average with a lower limit *of* 4000 and an upper limit of 14000. An effort was made to group contiguous villages with homogenous population, which were conscious of belonging to one group. Care wa taken to keep in the boundaries of *g.uar-ha1qas* (lowest revenue division) and *thanas* (lowest police division) intact.3 The country wa divided into 8,216 unions out of which 3,055 lie in West Pakistan.4 A union council consisting normally of fifteen nwnibers was

created for every union. The council included appointed and elected members, the number of each category was to be determined in a way that the number of appointed members should never exceed

1. *Se Basic Democracies Order,* the 'Gaette of Pakiatan Extra-Ordinary, Octeber 27, 1959. *p.* 1792, here.in-ater to be cited as BDO.

2. T Discussions in the present paper w ould mostly confne themselves to the local ge,nment in West Pakistan, although except for *thana* counel, which is counteepart **of** iil council, the pattern in both the wings is exactly identical.

3. The West Pakistan Basic Democracies Election Report: 1959-60 (West Pakistan. Go,unment Publication: Lahore, 1960), p. 9, (here-in-after to be cited as *Election Report.* 1989.60) and *Collection of Rules, Regu lations and By-Laws Made Under the Municipal Adatracion Ordinance, 1960 and the Basic Democracyes Order, 1959.* (Published by piiiendent Printing Press, West Pakistan: Lahore. 1961), (hereafter to be -ipd as *Con).*

4. Election *Report, op. cit.,* p. 10.

one half of the elected members.5 The appointed members at the union level were appointed by the deputy commissioner. An elected member usually represents a population of 800 people.

The union council has a tenure of five years but it can be superceded earlier by the orders of the divisional commissioner.6 it elects a chairman from among its members who cannot be removed from his office during the life of the council.7 The chairman is the executive head of the council who presides over the council meetings as well as conducts its business on behalf of the council.8

The counterparts of union council in urban areas are union committees and town committees. The union committees are established in municipal areas with populations exceeding 14,000. Such areas are divided into unions, carved out on the basis of principle followed in the case of rural unions. A committee is constituted for each urban union which has an average of nine members. There is a provision for appointment of members to the union committees whose number should not be

more than the half total of elected members,9 but in actual practice no appointments have been made.10 There are 528 union committees in West Pakistan.11. Each union committee can have a chairman, elected by the members, who is then an ex-officio member of the municipal committee in whose jurisdiction the committee lies. The urban areas whose populations do not exceed 14,000 people have town committees. There are 186 town committees in West Pakistan.12 The composition of town committees is similar to that of union councils and union committees. The next level of local government for union councils and town committees is the tehsil council and for union committees, municipal committee. The tehsil is a revenue sub-division of the district. There are 183 tehsils in West Pakistan out of which forty are sub-divisions.13 The

5. *BDO.,* Chap. II

6. BDO., Chap. III

7. **BDO.,** p. 1787. The Basic Democracies Order was amended in November, 1963, to make proijision for removal of chairman by a no-confidence vote.

8. *BDO.,* p. 1776.

9. BDO., p. 1769.

10. Government of Pakistan, Bureau of National Reconstruction. *Dawn of New Era,* (n.d').

11. *Election Report, op. cit.,* p. 10.

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Report of the Provincial Administration Consnaissio,.* (Lahore 1960), p. **189.** The main difference between the tebsil and sub division is that the latter is headed by a junior CSP or PCS officer called sub-divisional magistrate or assistant commissioner **with** limited power over all government agencies represented at this level. There is no such functionaries in tehsils.

tehsii council consists of representative members, which include all the chairmen of the union councils and town committees in a tehail, appointed members and official members. It is laid down that total number of official and appointed members would

not exceed the number of representative members.14 The official members usually include the representatives **of** nation building departments such as Education, Agriculture, Health etc., **at** tehsil level. The appointed members are selected by the deputy nmissioner with the previous approval of the Comm ssioner.15 Ability **of** persons to render service to the people, representation of minorities and women, and of organisations concerned with agricultural, industrial **or** community development are some of the criteria to be used **in** the appointment of members.16 Where a tehsil is not a sub-division, the tehsl o1cer, which usually means tehsildar in the'former Punjab and N.W.F.P. and *mzskhtiarkar* in Sind, is the chairman of the tehsil councll. Otherwise, the sub-divisional officer (magistrate), called assistant commissioner **in** the former N.W.F.P. holds this office.

The second level of local government for urban areas (excluding those with populations lower than 14,000 which have town committees linked with the rural structure through tehsil councils) is. the municipal committee. The municipal committees are constituted under a separate ordinance called the **Municipal** Administration Ordinance, 1960, which repealed fourteen existing enactments **on** municipal government.17 There .are 108 municipal committees, eighty in West and twenty eight in st Pakistan, created under this Ordinance.18

The municipal committees consist of elected members, official members and appointed members, with the maximum number being forty fve.19 The number of elected members is limited to thirty. As these elected members are, in fact, the chairmen of union committees in the jurisdiction of the municipality, in some cases their number has exceeded this limit. To keep the limit of thirty the union committees have been divided into thirty groups, each group electing one of fheir chairmen as

14. *BDO., p.* **1769.**

15. *BDO., p.* **1771.**

16. *Ibid.* –

17. ***The Municipal*** Administration Ordinance ***1960*** **(Central Government Publication:** Karachi, 1960), here-in-after to lie cite l as *MAO.*

18. Aniwal **Report on** *Bask* **Democracies, October 27, 1959 to** *October 27, 1960,* produced by Bureau of National Reconstruction, Government of Pakistan (Karachi,

n.dj, here-in-after to be cited as *Annual* **Report on Bask Democracies.** *Cellecijon• op. c*., p.* 5.

36.

a member of the municipal committee.20 In committees where elected embers are not more than ten, it is provided that the total number of official and appointed members shall be equal to the elected members. Otherwise, the total number of official and appointed members should not be less than one half of the total number of elected members or more than the number of elected members. In no case should the total number of offlcial members exceed the total number of appointed members.21

All the municipal committees have official chairmen whc are also the official members of the committees In the case of seven first class municipalities in West Pakistan, the chairmen are appointed by the provincial government. In the case of second class municipalities these powers are given to the commissioners who are authorised to appoint part-time or whole-time chairmen. A vice-chairman of the committee is elected from among the elected members who unlike the chairman of the union council is removeable by no-confidence motion.22 The delegation of power to the vice-chairman can be effected by the chairman with the approval of the controlling authority, which in the case of first class municipalities is the provincial government and in the case of others, the divisional commissioners.

The third tier of Basic Democracies, where both urban and rural structures converge, is the district council. There are forty five district councils for West Pakistan and seventeen for East 'Pakistan, one council for each district. The district councils include appointed members and official members. The official members are chairmen of tehsil council and municipal committees, vice-chairmen of cantonment boards and representatives of departments at the district level appointed by the commissioner. The total number of appointed members should not be less than the number of official members, and one half of the appoiilted members have to be from among the chairmen of the union councils, union committees and town committees

in the district. The deputy commissioner is the chairman of the district council.23 The actual number of members of district council varies between thirty and forty five.

The fourth tier of the Basic Democracies system is the divisional council. There are at present twelve divisions in West Pakistan and three divisions in East Pakistan; each having a divisional council. The

20. *Annual **Report of Basic** Democracies, op. cit., p.* 15.
21. ***Collection, op. cit., p.*** 5.
22. ***MAO., op. cit., p. 6.***
23. ***BDO., op. cit., p.*** 1770. Provincial Assemblies of both provincea have enacted legislation to provide for vice-chairmen for the district councils.

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representatives of government departments, municipal committees and cantonment boards are appointed by the provincial governments as its members. There is an equal number of non-official members and appointed members, one half of which have to be from among the **chairmeii of** the union councils, union committees and the town committees.24 The commissioner of a divi&on is the chairman o this council.

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II

Functions

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The distribution of functions between the various tiers of Basic Democracies is patterned in a way that union councils, town committees, district councils and municipal committees have direct executive responsibilities while tehsil and divisional council have only co-ordinative functions. The only exception to this rule is municipal committee which combine both co-ordinative and executive functions.

There is a long list of functions assigned to union councils which include maintenance of public ways and streets, preservation **of** plantations, management of *shamiltzt* (common village land) and burial grounds, sanitation of village including street sweeping, regulation **of** slaughter houses, provision of pure water supplY, registration of births, and deaths, provision of relief f¼r the destitute and promotion **of** agricultural development.25 It has limited law and order functions to perform for which it could establish village police.26 It is supposed to assist the revenue department in collection of revenue. The new functions **of great** significance have been added to this list recently, which are **the** administration of Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 and the West Pakistan Conciliation Courts Ordinance, l962.

The Family Laws Ordinance requires the registration of all marriages and authorises union councils to make necessary arrangements **by** appointment of *nikah* registrars. The Ordinance also attempts to regulate polygamy and requires that any person who wants to have a second wife, should approach the chairman of union council after securing the consent of the first wife, who will constitute an arbitration council to take a decision on such a request. A person intending to divorce his wife is required to give a notice to this effect to the chairman union council, a

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24. *Ibid.,* **p. 1770.**
25. . *BDO., op.* **cit., p. 1792.**
26. **Village Polic0 have not yet** been **introduced except in districts of** Peshawar, Multan, and **llyderabad. Recenxly they have been withdrawn even from these districts.**

copy of which is supplied to the wife. The chairman of a union council constitutes an arbitration council consisting of, two other persons nominated by the parties and himself heads such a council. The function of the arbitration council is to bring about conciliation. If this fails, the divorce becomes effectve after ninety days from the date of notice. The constitution of such a council is also required if the wife lodges a complaint against the husband about his failure to maintain her adequately.27 The

proceedings of all cases before the arbitration councils are held in camera unless the chairman directs orthewise.28 All the decisions of the councils are taken by majority vote and in case of lack of a majority the chairman's decision is the decision of the council.29

An appeal against the decision of the arbitration council about permission to have a second wife or about maintenance allowance can be referred to the deputy commissioner in West Pakistan within thirty days of the decision of the council and his decision is considered final and no courts have jurisdiction over it. A person other than the nikah registrar who solemnises a marriage but fails to report it to the union council can be punished with simple imprisonment for three months or can be fined. The punishment for contracting a second marriage without the permission of the arbitration council may extend to one year imprisonment or a fine of one thousand rupees besides immediate payment of dowery due to the first wife.

The Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961, gives to the union council some judicial power of bringing about conciliation in certain types of disputes. A party to a dispute can request the chairman of the union council to constitute a conciliation court which consists of two nominees of the parties involved, each nominating one. The chairman of the union council acts as chairman of the conciliation court. The dispute cart be referred to the union council in whose jurisdiction the dispute has arisen. The court cannot award any punishment but can order the payment of a given amount 'of compensation to the aggrieved parties. The decision of the court in. case of a criminal charge could be revised by the deputy commissioner and in case of civil cases by the district judge. Counsels are not permitted to appear before the court. The court can prosecute and fine a person who commits contempt of court. has the power to summon the witnesses.

The union committee has almost no specified functions. However, it can assume those functions which the municipal committee approves

27. *Muslim Family Law Ordinance,* 1961.
28. *The West Pakistan Rules unler the Muslim Family Law Ordi,pznce, 19&l.*
29. *Ibid.*

or delegates to it. The functions which it can assume include promotion of adult education, enforcement of compulsory education, undertaking of measures for the welfare of the destitute, preventing beggary, prostitution, and juvenile delinquency, management and maintenance of 1 meeting places, civil defence propagation of family planning, provision of relief measures, and helping the organisation of co-operatives, community development and first aid centres: It can also open libraries, prevent encroachment on public ways, and take measures to promote sanitation. It acts as territorial sub-committee of the municipal committee and it is obligatory upon the municipal committee to consult it in affairs with which the people in the union are concerned. The municipal committee can also transfer management of any municipal institution to the union committee. The union committees are expected to report to the relevant authority the commission of any offence in the unions and explain to the inhabitants of the unions the policies of the government and the municipal committees and bring to the notice of the government the complaints and grievances of the people. With regard to the Muslim Family Law Ordinance and Conciliation Courts Ordinance the functions of the union committee are exactly similar to those of the union council The functions of the town committee are not different from those of union committees.

Tehsil councils, the second tier for union councils, and town committees, have the responsibility of co-ordinating the activities of the union councils and town committees in their jurisdiction and undertake those functions which the district councils entrust to them or government directs them to perform. The tehsil councils are responsible to district councils for activities and works under their direction.

The functions of the municipal committee include all activities directed towards improvement of public health, provision of pure water and drainage facilities, town planning, establishment and maintenance of public markets, public ways, streets, veterinary hospitals, arrangement of cattle shows, and regulation of slaughter

houses. They are also responsible for co-ordination of activities of the union committees.30

District councils have two types of functions, compulsory and optional. The compulsory functions include provision and maintenance of primary schools, hospitals and dispensaries, public roads, public ferries, cattle ponds, and rest houses. They also have the responsibility of regulating traffic and promoting the adoption of improved methods of agriculture. There are nearly seventy optional functions which concern

30. *MAO.* **Part** IV.

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secondary education, social and economic welfare of the people, and certain aspects of public health and public works.31

The major function of the divisional councils *is* co-ordination of the activities of all local bodies in the division, scrutinising the development schemes, reviewing of progress of administration of the divisions and recommending measures for improvement. Under instructions from government, they could undertake any function on behalf of the district council.

The various tiers of Basic Democracies are inter-connected in differtent ways. Firstly, there is the element of common membership in the various tiers. The chairmen of the union councils are ex-officio members of the tehsil councils, with nearly one fourth of the district and divisional council membership coming from the union councils and town committees' chairmen. The chairmen of the lower tiers are members of their next upper tier, Secondly, the elected members of union councils, town committees and union committees cannot be removed without passing a resolution on the subject by a majority of the representative members o the next higher councils. The chairmen of the union councils who are ex-officio members of the tehsil councils can be removed by resolution passed in the district councils with a

majority vote of nonofficial members (excluding the appointed non-official members). Thirdly, union councils prepare development plans and those which require finances from the government are submitted to the tehsil councils. The tehsil councils after due scrutiny make their recommendations to the district councils for allocation of funds which eventually sanction the schemes and provide the required funds. Besides, all the plans prepared by various departments have to be submitted to the district councils for approval. The divisional councils on the basis of total demand of the distrIct councils allocate the funds to them from the general development grants of the provincial government.

This inter-connection and interdependence of councils is, however, limited to the above described areas. Beyond this, the deputy commissioners and the commissioners control the local councils on the basis of powers given to them under the Basic Democracies Order or other government notifications. They are not required to use these powers in consultation with the higher tiers of local councils. For instance the budget of the union councils are approved by the deputy commissioners and not by the tehsil council. The deputy commissioners give these approvals in their capacity as district officers and not as chairmen of the district councils. Also no consultation with district councils is required.

31. *BDO.,* pp. 1787-1802.

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Chapter 1V

SCOPE AND METHOD OF THE STUDY

At present there are four levels of Basic Democracies functioning at three traditional levels of administration. These are: the division, the district and the tehsil levels and one newly created level—the union. The scope of the present study is limited to three levels viz., the union, tehsil and district. There is no other reason for excluding divisional council from the study except that this would have made the study

unusually wieldy and would have required larger resources than those which were conveniently available.

The Basic Democracies cover both rural as well as urban sectors of the society. The urban bodies which include union committees, town committees and municipal committees are integrated into the system in accordance with their size and status. The dichotomy of urban-rural which exists at the union and, to some extent, tehsil level, disappears at the district and divisional levels. The scope of the present study is restricted only to the rural bodies at the lower level Thus the union committees, town committees and municipal committees are excluded from its purview. Again, the reason, of course, is not that the two sectors need entirely separate treatment because of their uniqueness. The country, being largely' rural, the proportion of rural bodies is far larger and therefore any serious attempt to study the Basic Democracies in rural areas has to confine itself to the study of either of the two sectors unless the researcher has larger resources at his disposal. Also the fact that the present researcher has had previous research experience in the area of rural Basic Democracies, encouraged him to go rather deeply into this sector.

Out of the fifty-one districts and political agencies in West Pakistan only two districts were selected for study—one from the former NWFP where most of the people speak Pushto and the other from the former Punjab where most of the people speak Punjabi. No district was taken from the former Sind or Baluchistan region because the two regions were at too great a distance from research headquarters.

The district Abad,1 selected from the former NWFP has an area of 1,211 miles and is the smallest district of the region in size. Its position with respect to area **is** 45th in West Pakistan. Its population is 8,13,840 persons and in comparison with the other five district in the former NWFP it is the third langest district in population. The position of ths district with respect to population is thirtieth in West Pakistan. In density of population it ranks second in the region with a density of 612 persons per square mile and sixth in West Pakistan. Eight per cent of the population of this

district is literate. This is lower than two districts and equal to three districts of the region. The position of this district in this respect is fortieth in West Pakistan. It is considered to be a fairly rich d'strict of the region and is known for its cultivation of sugarcane, tobacco, developed sugar industry and tobacco industry. Nearly half the cultivated area is irrigated by canals. Most of the district is a flat plain and the country side is accessible by metalled or unmetalled roads. The district has 276 miles of road of which 53 miles are shingled and. 14 are unmetalled. It is believed to possess a relatively high level of political consciousness with some concentrated influence of movements for regional autonomy.

In some of the above described characteristics such as literacy, and size of population it is representath'e of other districts in West Pakistan while in other characteristics such as density and area, it is not representative. On average, however, the district represents the various cultural characteristics of this region.

The other district, Sultanpur which is in the north west of the former Punjab, was selected to represent the Punjab region. Most of its population speaks Punjabi. It has a literacy percentage of about thirteen which is smaller than nine districts and is larger than nine districts in the former Punjab including Bahawalpur. This makes it perfectly representative on this score. Its population, which is 7,66,813, is smaller than fourteen districts and larger than three districts of former Punjab. Its size is 4,148 square miles which is larger than eight districts and smaller than nine districts of former Punjab. It5 density of population is 185 per square mile which is larger than three districts of the former Punjab but smaller than fifteen of its districts.

District Sultanpur is representative of the former Punjab in literacy and size but not representative in density and population. The average population of both districts is around the average population of a district of West Pakistan which is 8,40,000

1. *All* names used in this study are fictitious.

persons. The area of this district is only slightly smaller than the mean area of a district in West Pakistan which is 6100 square miles. The area of Abad, however, is much smaller than the mean area.

The above analysis indicates that the two districts selected for study are representatives of districts in West Pakistan in some respects and not in other respects. However, their selection was dictated by one other important reason for the researcher, the proximity to the headquarters of the Academy **for** Rural Development. Peshawar. If this factor had not been taken into account the findings of the present study probably would have been relatively more representative but the quality and intensiveness may have suffered.

Each district has one district council and both have been studied. There are six tehsils in the two districts, two in Abad and four - in Sultanpur. Two of these tehsils are of the status of a sub-division while the--remaining four have the traditional administrative set-up in which there is no coordinator like sub-divisional officer. All the six tehsil councils have been studied.

In the study of district councils, focus has been on an analysis of their finances, their role in the. field of development and on the quality **of** membership of the councils. Attention has also been devoted to their quality of discussion, their method of arriving at decision and their level **of** attendance. Level of attendance, effectiveness in its coordinative role and methods of arriving at decisions are also three aspects of tehsil councils which have been studied.

In district Abad there are fifty four union councils, and s:xty one in district Sultanpur. It was decided to study one-third of all the union councils. Consequently eighteen councils from Abad and twenty one in Sultanpur fell in the sample. Sampling was done on two bases. Firstly, a tehsil was taken as the unit for sampling. Secondly, union councils were divided into three categories on the basis of their distance from tehsil headquarters. The distance was calculated by giving double weight to the unmetalled road. For instance a union which was ten miles from the tehsil headquarter b-ut was connected with metalled road was placed in the same category as a union at five miles from the tehsil headquarters but connected by unmetalled

road. This stratification on the basis of distance was meant to avoid over-representation or under- representation of the unions more exposed to urban influence. Onethud of the unions were selected at random from each *category,* based distance from the tehsil headquarters.

Analysis **of** socio-economic characteristics such as attittades, beliefs, w-ledge and opinions of the union councillors are stressed in the study.

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This is not only to find out how these. qualities are related to their role but also to determine the type of leadership which is emerging in the rural area.

The conclusions of this part of the study have theoretical as well as practical implications. Besides the analysis o individual characteristics of the couneillors, the study is directed toward analysing the characteristics of union councils as units of organisation and the factors associated with their functional operation. Also, attention is given to the analysis of the budgets of the councils, their expenditure in the field of development and their implementation of the Conciliation Courts Ordinance and the Family Laws Ordinance. Finally, the administrative set up of the Basic Democracies from Union councils upto the district council has been analysed.

Method

Four investigators were employed to interview the members of the union councils. All the interviewers had training upto M.A. Some of them had previous experience in interviewing All could speak three languages—English, Urdu—the national language of West Pakistan and a regional language Pushto or Panjabi. They were given a few lectures on research methodology. Then the objectives of the project were explained to them. The interview schedule was developed in collaboration with the investigators in order to make them aware of the importance of each question as it related to the ultimate objectives **of** the project. The interview schedules were translated by the Investigators in both the regional languages. This was to enable

them to develop a standaraised translation of the questionnaire. All the interviews were conducted in the regional languages although the schedule before the interviewer was in English and they wrote the responses of the interviewees in English.

A pilot study was conducted in four neighbouring union councils which served two purposes. It provided necessary practice **to the** investigators in interviewing as well as serving as a pretest of the questionnaire. The pilot study was not written up but the answers **of the** interviewees were tabulated and analysed to test some **of the** hypotheses.

In the light of the pilot study necessary changes were made in the schedules. Some new -questions were added, some old dropped. **The** schedules were also reorganised.

Reliance was placed on three instruments of research:

1 Interviews of the members of various tiers of Basic Democracies.
2. Consultation of Records of Basic Democracies.
3. Observations.

Greater reliance was placed on interviewing. Four interview schedules were developed:

1 Interview schedule for union couneillors.
2. Interview schedule for official members of tehsil council.
3 Interview schedule for official members of district council.
4. Interview schedule for non-official members of district **counciL**

All are attached as appendices to the study.

The interview schedule for the union councillors was administered hy the investigators. They were provided a list of do's and don't's in regard to interviewing. They had instructions to carry out the interviews in absolute secrecy but this was not always possible. A private interview possibly arouses unnecessary curiosity or over-awes the interviewee who then becomes too alert. On the other hand a public interview may lead to bias and opinions not acceptable to surrounding people may not be frankly expressed. However, a majority of the interviews were conducted privately.

The investigators faced numerous difficulties in interviewing the union councillors. These mainly stemmed from the fact that the union couneillç,rs came from different villages. Due to lack of transport and bad roads, especially in district Sultanpur where the populaf on is more scattered, it was too time-consuming to contact a councillor in. his own village and at his own residence. Consequently the following procedure was adopted to interview the councillors:

a) Assistant directors Basic Democracies of both the districts were requested to help us in contacting the councillors.

b) The assistant directors prepared a program for the investigators to visit the union councils which were in the sample and informed the secretaries and chairmen of th union councils about the date and time of the visit of **the** investigators.

c) The visit of the investigators were fixed usually on the day when the councils held their monthly meetings.

This procedure has one implication for the study. The investigators were identified as government officials and sometimes their visit was thought to be an inspection of the union council. Obviously such an image **of** the role of the investigator cannot be helpful in eliciting bue responses to questions such as attitudes towards Basic Deniocracies, attitudes towards public servants or questions on the Family Laws

Ordinance, 1961 which were included in the schedules. To counteract this problem the investigators were alerted to this danger and to its possible effect on the research. They were instructed to remove any suspicion of being considered **a** government official through explanation of the project, and by assuring the interviewee that the information provided by the councillors would remain confidential and the interview woulc not bring them any harm. Inspite of this, however, some possibility of their being considered a government servant cannot be ruled out. This source of bias in the study had to be allowed in view of the absence of any other feasible alternative.

The union councillors were usually co-operative in being available for the interview. In no case was there any resistance to nterviewing. However, the investigators effort to interview all the councillors in one visit was not usually successful as the union councillors who were absent from the meeting were not easily available. Sometimes the investgators prolonged their stay to meet such couneillors. At other times they revisited the union. Inspite of this, the investigators were not able to interview twelve per cent of the counciilors in the sample. Some of the councillors were away from the district and were not expected to return in the near future. The non-availability of twelve per cent coüncillors is likely to be. another source of bias in the study. The councillors not interviewed are more likely to be those who are less regular in the meetings of the council. This probably could also mean lack of interest in the activities of the council. If this is true, it is likely to effect som of the conclusions of the study. The degree of seriousness, however, cannot be ascertained.

An interview schedule for the official members of the tehsil council was developed. The investigators tried to contact all the official members but out of thirty seven only thirty three officers could be interviewed. Since the officers were literate they usually wanted to take the interview schedule with them and till it in themselves. The investigators could not always resist this. In one case an official member dictated his replies to his stenographer who typed them and handed it over to the investigator. In another case an officer became so scared of the interview that he asked hs clerk to sit with him throughout the interview. Except these few cases the interviews were generally smooth.

The most difficult interviewing was that of the district councillors. Some of the official members resisted being interviewed. A superintendent of police reasoned that he, being a government servant, would first get permission from his boss and then answer our questions. In another case *an* officer exclaimed; "as government servants, we are not supposed to

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express our. views about Basic Democracies." The only convenient way of contacting the district coundilors was to meet them on the day the district council met. Consequently after knowing the date of meeting of the council, the deputy commissioners of the two districts were usually requested to give us permission to interview the councillors. The deputy commissioners acdeded to our request. But once the meeting was over, it was not always possible to interview the members who were anxious to leave. The official members usually wanted to take the schedules with them and promised us written replies. however, we usually did not get our prolormas. As a result of this we were able to get the required information only after several visits to the district headquarters. Even then, all members could not be interviewed. As a result when we had interviewed more than fifty per ëent of the district councillors, we decided to• give up further efforts.

The second source of our data was records f .the union, tehsil and district councils. The secretaries of these councils were usually willing to make the records available. But the quality of the records varied in different unions, tehsils and districts. For instance, the record of one district council was comprehensive, well maintained and was easily available, while that of the other was poorly maintained. The same was true of one of the tehsil councils. The union councils' records were generally well maintained.

Proformas were developed for use on examining the records of union and the tehsil councils. These are appended to the study. Information was collected about meetings, attendance budgets, development activities, disputes settled, committees of the council, etc.

Another rith source of informatton was the records of correspondence which Ihe different councils had with different agencies. From this correspondeice, histories of some cases were prepared. Cases of correspondence of councils with the following agencies were collected:

a) Selected cases of correspondence between the district council and all tehsil councils.
b) Selected cases of correspondence between district councils and five Nation Building Departments of the district.
c) Selected cases of correspondence between each tehsil council and three major Nation Building Departments (Education, Agriculture and Public Health) in that ehsil.
d) Selected cases of correspondence between tehsil councils and five union councils.

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some cases were selected from all the correspondence in the record since the inception of the Basic Democracies. The information gained was utilised to determine the inter-relationship of the various tiers of Basic Democracies and district administration.

The other records consulted included the tour diaries of the deputy commissioner, he assistant director, the development officer and the written replies which the district administration submitted to the Governor's Inspection Team. The district gazeteer did not help in providing much relevant information since it was not upto-date.

The third source of information was observations of the investigators at the meeting of the councils about the behaviour, of the counefliors, the condition *of* the record of the councils and the role of me chairmen. The investigators were provided with a list of aspects to be o'Dserved. The author of this study himself sometimes participated in these meetings and kept elaborate notes of his observations. At the end of the.

investigation, the investigators submitted a detailed report on thefr ,observaàns to the author.

The data collected through various Sources were usually transferred to Mcbee cards. Thus, it was necessary that qualitative answers be converted into quantitative data and frequencies of replies were established. In this respect, one major problem was the rating of the answers. For instance an index of westernisation was needed. There were four items in this index; attitude towards female education, belief in consultation of sons and daughters about their prospective marriage parifiers, belief in prohibition of alcohol, belief in segregation of sexes, and attitude towards faxnily planning etc. The problem was how to rate each reply with reference to various possible answers to the same question and in relationship to the other items of the index. How these problems were solved and what scales were developed to rate the answers are discussed in the Methodological Appendlx

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PART II

LEADERSHIP IN
UNION COUNCILS

Chapter V

RECRUITMENT OF LOCAL POLITICAL LEADERS

Out of the several functions which any polity has to perform **one** is recruitment of persons for political roles. In different societies the structures that perform this function and their styles of performance are different. In a primitive society there is greater reliance on primary groups for political recruitments while in a more differentiated society. political parties, associational interest groups or public service commissions perform this function in addition to the primary groups. Less differentiated societies employ ascriptive and particularistie criteria of recruitment while the differentiated societies tend to. give more consideration to performance and universal criteria.1

In the present chapter our interest is in the process of recruitment of the members of union councils in Pakistan, the classes, age groups, pdueational groups to which they belong and finally in determining the criteria which the electorate employ in selecting them.

Traditionally in West Pakistan the political leadership in the village has been the preserve of the big landlord. The economic power **ol** the landlord which control over means of production. provided, was further fortified by the myth of belonging to 'respectable castes'. This leadership was sustained by contracting marriages and power alliances with other landlords even when the economic bases were eroded by division of property. In the areas where land ownership patterns were more egalitarian, as size of land owned and membership of 'respectable' tribes or castes could not be sources of distinction, personal qualities such as age and ability to establish contact with the lower bureaucracy became bases of leadership. In the absence of autonomous differentiated interest groups in the village, there was never any serious challenge to this established leadership.

1. Gabrial Almond and *James* Coleman, *Politics of Developing Area,* (Princeton, 1963), *pp.* 31.32.

In the twentieth century the village society in West Pakistan became more and more exposed to external influences. Contacts of local leadership with local administration increased. With the coming of institution of local government, the local leadership was called upon to become members of punchayats and district boards. However, as initially the membership of local government was nominated, the big landlords automatically got it as a reward for loyalty to the colonial regime.2 Besides, by acquiring some modern western education without which it could not associate with new political. institution, the landed aristocracy further legitimised their exclusive leadership in the eyes of bureaucracy as well as illiterate rural masses. Till independence, landed aristocracy was secure in its political leadership because even when election became the basis of membership of local government, the right of vote was so narrowly restricted that it only required manipulation of a few hundred people in the constituency.3

But after independence several forces started eroding the base of this exclusive politmil leadership. These included introduction of adult franchise, extension of educational facilities in the villages aid gradual emergence of "elects"—interest group organised around caste and tribes.4 Introduction of Land Reforms in 1958 and Basic Democracies in 1959 further helped to broaden the base of political recruitment. In the election of the Basic Democracies held In 1959-60, the clans, tribe, kinship and family functioned as structures of recruitment.5 The influence of political parties was negligible as they were banned at the time of election. The criteria employed were generally ascriptive and particularistic, though there was emphasis on educational qualification of the candidates as well,6

From what classes do the union couneillors come? What interests do they represent? What socio economic characteristics distinguish them from the rural masses. How influential are they These are significant questions about recruitment of this new local leadership to answer which we turn to the empirical evidence available.

2. Hugh Tinker, *The Foundations of La rat Self-Government in bdia, Pakistan and Burma* (London, 1954), pp. 54-79.

3. *Ibid.*

4 See Iaayatuflah, "Rural Power Structure in West Pakistan" minion, (US AID. Karachi).

5. *Ibid.,* pp. 75-90, also *West Pakistan Ba sic Democracies Eitctio Report* (Lahore. 1960),

p. 25.

6. See *Rural Power Structure in West Pakistan, op. cit.,* pp. 59.90. Tnayatullah, *Study of Union Councils in Nawsi%era Tehs[j* (Peshawar, 1961), pp. 11.1 *Study of Selected Union Council itt Rawalpindi Dvjsion* (Peshawar, 1962), -pp. 12.13; and *Election Re. pert, op. cit., p.* 25.

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Socio-economic Characteristics of Union Councillors

As discussed earlier the union is a new area of local government which is comprised of several villages. Emergence of the union is recognition of the fact that the village is too small to be a viable unit of local government and several villages with ethnic homogeneity and harmony of interests could provide themselves social services more economically. The union council also interlinks the leadership of the isolated villages into a formal structure and is thus intended to strengthen where inter-village informal ties exist and create new ties where they were otherwise absent.

The union council is the lowest unit and from the point of view of training in self-government the most vital unit in the Basic Democracies system. Only in this tier is the membership directly elected and no functionary of the provincial government is its member. It is at this level that the peasant society establishes its first contact with local government.

As indicated in an earlier chapter there are 4,053 union councils in East and 3,055 councils in West Pakistan. The number of elected members in East is 40,000 and

39,846 in West Pakistan. Nearly sixteen per cent of the members in East and twenty five per cent in West Pakistan were elected unopposed.7 Probably this difference reflects the higher level of political aspiration and diffusion **of** power in Bast Pakistan. In West Pakistan the higher percentage **of** unopposed members may be as much due to unanimi.ty in the electorate as due to lower political aspirations in the peasantry and overwhelming power of the big landlords. However a greater percentage **01** voters (73% in West Pakistan, 65% in East Pakistan and 52% in Karachi) actually voted in the Basic Democracies elections in West Pakistan than in East Pakistan. This however, does not necessarily indicate a higher interest in politics in West Pakistan than in East Pakistan and Karachi. The reasons forth lower voting percentage seem to be the relati' freedom of voters from economic pressures as well as initial scepticism **of** politics oriented groups in East Pakistan and Karachi towards Basic Democracies. In West Pakistan, the presence of feudalism and a rather rigid social structure exerted compulsive influence on the voters to vote.

Half the number of all the elected union councillors **were** nominated by the district magistrates in East and deputy commissioners in West Pakistan. The deputy commissioners and district magistrates usually relied on their revenue, police and community development staff for determining the eligibility of a person for nomination. However, as a

7. Government of Pakistan. Bureau of National Reconstruction, *Annual Report on Base czes* 1959-60 (Karachi n.d.), *p.* 10.

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policy the persons defeated in the elections were not nominated. Retired government servants, leaders active in community development and social work were generally preferred.

Age

According to an. estimate the average age of union councillors in Pakistan is 35-40 years.8

The union councillors in the present sample can be placed in the following age groups—

Table __ 1

Age groups of the 588 Union Councillors

Number . Percentage Below 30 years 30 5 30 to 45 279 47 46to60 " 211 36 Above 60 " 68 12 588 100

The above data suggests that a. majority of union councillors were of an age (30 to 60 years) which can bring them maturity and richness of experience.

If the ages of the couneillors in the sample are compared with the corresponding age groups of rural males aged more than ninteen years of the two districts (only, persons above twenty one years can be elected) the following table emerges—

Table—2

Comparison of Age Groups of 58 Couneillors
with the Ages of Rural Males who are more
than Nineteen Years

Councillors Male rural population (above nineteen years) Below 30 years 5 29 From 30 to 60 " 83 55 Above60 " 12 16 100 100

* Source: Census of 1961. There is slight dfference in the age categories of present study from those of Census.

8. Government of Pakistan, Bureau of National Reconstrueton, *Dawn of a New Era* (n.d), **p.** 2-4.

The above table suggests that people between twenty to twenty nine years who were eligible for membership of the council were under-represented by twenty four per cent. The age group beyond sixty years was also under-represented but not seriously. The age group between thirty to sixty years was over-represented by twenty eight per cent.

Comparing the above figures with those available from a study of union councillors of East Pakistan,9 the present councillors tended to be older.10 The councillors below thirty years of age constitute five per cent of the total in the present sample, while in the *East Pakistan Study* sample they were ten per cent of the total. Similarly there were **nearly** twelve per cent of the councillors who were beyond sixty years in the present sample, while in *East Pakistan Study* sample this percentage was only nine. This may be indicative of the emergence of younger leader in East Pakistan as compared with West Pakistan. and a decline in the importance of old age in politics. This interpretation would be more. plausible if the hypothesis that in West Pakistan political orientation is more traditional than in East Pakistan is accepted.

Table—3

Comparison of Ages of 588 Elected and Nominated Union Councillors

Nominated Elected Total cairn illors councillors
No. **O/** NO. ％ NO. %
Below 30 years *7* 4 23 6 30 **5** Between 30 to 60 " 153 80 337 85 490 83
Above 60 " 31 16 37 9 68 **12**
191 100 397 100 588 100

(X2 = 6.7781, significant at the 1% level with two degree of freedom)

It is shown in the above table that eighty five per cent of the elected and eighty per cent of the nominated members belonged to the age group of thirty to sixty years. On the other hand sixteen per cent of the **elected** and nine per cent of the nominated

members belonge **to** higher **age** categories. This leads to the conclusion that elected members were comparatively younger than the nominated members. It is difficult

9. ***An*** *Analysis of. the Working of Basic Democrary Institution5 in East Pakistan, a* joint project **by** Bureau of National Reconstruction and the Pakistan Academy for **Rural Devrlomnent, Comilla (Dacca, 1961), (memo) here-inrafter to be cited as** *East **Pakistan Study.***

10. A total of 298 councillors including chairmen were included i0 this study.

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to ascertain whether the 'controlling authority' nominated older people as a matter of policy. However, it is likely that other characteristics such as influence, prestige and conservatism which Probably qualfled person for nomination to the membership of the council were found in relatively older people.

Education

Education is an important qualification for the performance of an effective role of citzensh'ip in a modern state. In fact il is literacy and education which enables a heterógerious, isolated and passive population of developing countries to profit from mass media of communication, become aware of its own political interests and develop an identfication with the nation and the political system. However, the problem in Pakistan, as in other deivieloping countries, is that on the one hand there is concentration of education in urban centres from which the national, politigal and administrative leardership is recruited and on the other hand rural masses who constitute the majority of the population, are illiterate and find it difficult to comprehend the policies and actions of educated leadership. This gap between the leadership and masses could be filled i the educated and semi-educated men in villages could be organised and made the media of communication between the two groups. Do the leadership have enough education to perform this function?

Eight per cent of the elected union councillors have education up to tenth grade or more, seventy six per cent have education less than tenth grade and nearly sixteen per cent are ilhiterate.11 The highest level of literacy among the councillors is in East Pakistan where it is ninety eight per cent. In West Pakistan it is nearly seventy per cent12

In view of our findings that nominated councillors tend to be more literate than the elected councillors, (see subsequent analysis) the level of literacy is likely to be still higher for the total group (including both elected and nominated) of the union councillors. In a country where literacy is not more than nineteen per cent (for ages five years and above) the fact that eighty-four per cent of the union coundillors are literate is quite significant.13 It suggests that the rural electorate has brought maximum education to the council membership from its limited educational resources. It also suggests and our further analysis corborates it, that education is increasingly becoming the source of influence and power in the rural society. This is of course understandable. So long as the rural society was isolated from the national Life

11. *Annual Report, op. cit., p.* 11.
12. *Ibid., p.* **11.**
13. *Population Census of Pakistan, 1961. Literacy an4 Education Bulletin. No. 4.*

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its leadership derived its influence from entirely local and parochial factors. With the breakdown of the traditional isolation of the village and penetration of the influence of state, government, and bureaucrac7 4 in the village life, literacy and education. are becoming functional elements in establishing contact between the rural society and new seats of powers and therefore a necessary qualification for leadership.

How does the leadership in union councils compare with national, political and administrative leadership in its educational attainment?

Table — 4

**Comparison of Education Level of Members
of National Assembly of Pakistan (1962)
and Elected Union Counellors**

Elected Union Councillors Members of National Assembly

Tenth grade and above 8 **82**

Below tenth grade *76* **18**

tfliterate 16 0 –

100 100

The members of the National Assembly seem to be distinguished from the union councillors by two educational characterisUcs.14 A majority of the members of the National Assembly have education upto tenth grade or more. Among the councillors only a small number of people have this level of education. Also illiteracy is totally absent from among the National Assembly members while one-sixth of the councillors are illiterate. The difference between thétwo groups is quite natural. The National Assembly Membership generally comes from the elite of the society which of course have greater opportunities of getting education. Most of the councillors come from the rural middle class with limited opportunities for higher education. However it leads the conclusion that the level of education is associated with **level of** leadership.

For entrance into bureaucracy, education is a necessary qualificaUon. This condition does not exist to qualify for a political position.

14. The data about councillors are taken from *Annual Report op. cit., p.* 11. Th0 data about neinbera of National Assembly are taken from Mushtaq Ahmad. *Government and PolUics i Pakistan* (Karachi, 1960), p. 273. Mu near Ahmad, *The Changing Ride & Attitudes **o** she Ciail Sertkrnis* i *Pakistan* (An unpublished ,manuscript).

Therefore there is generally a concentration of - highly educated people in bureaucracy than in the political sector. In a sample of 502 public servants, among whom nearly half were of Class I status, nearly eighty two per cent bad education upto graduation or more and the remaining were undergraduates. This indicates that the level of education in the bureaucracy is higher than that prevalent among the councillors, However, as it comes out in later analysis, the difference in educational levels of the elected union councillors in Pakistan and the official members of six tehsil councils and two district councils included in the present sample is as follows: sixty seven per cent of the official members of tehsil councils and sixty six per cent of those of district councils are graduate or more while among the councillors only 70 per cent are graduates.15

This difference in the level of educational attainment in the bureaucracy and leadership in the lowest tier of Basic Democracies may not be conducive to promoting a partnership relationship between bureaucracy and Basic Democracies. The effect of this factor is likely to be more serious as the bureaucracy tends to exaggerate the low level of literacy among the councillors.16 On the other hand, with the emergence of a comparatively more educated class of rural leaders at the union level, the power of bureaucracy vis-a-vis the masses, is likely to be reduced.

In the sample the union councillors have the following level of education __

Table — 5

Level of Education in 588 Union Councillors of two Districts of West Pakistan

Number Percentage 155 27
351 60
Illiterate Upto eighth grade Upto tenth grade
Above tenth grade

15.- See chapter XXI and XXII.
16. Discussions about Basic Democrate among the government servants generally assume that Basic Democrats are illiterate, in several of my classes I have asked the

government servants to estimate the level of literacy among the councillors. The percentage has never risen beyond 50. Ignorance about literacy level of councillors seems to exist in circles other than bureaucracy. Leader of opposition, Mr. Yusaf Khattak speaking on the Franchise Bill said. "It was contended by the Government benches that the system of indirect elections was being introduced as the people were illiterate. If **that** most of the members of Basic Democracies were equally illiterate *Dawn,* March 29 1964, p. 11.

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Literacy in this sample is less than that obtaining' in all the **Union** Councillors (elected) in Pakistan by twelve per cent but more than **that** prevailing in councillors in West Pakistan by six per cent, Out **of the** forty-eight per cent have education upto the intermediate level, fifteen twenty-seven councillors who have education beyond matriculation, per cent are graduates and thirty-seven per cent are law graduates,

The percentage of illiterates among the elected members is twice: that of the nominated members. At higher levels of education the percentage of nominated members is greater than the elected members. (Table 6). For instance, eighty-five per cent of the nominated members have education upto eighth grade or above while only seventy-eight pev cent of the elected members belong to this category. This clearly suggests that the nominated members are far more educated than the elected members. The relationship is statistically significant as **is** indicated below.

Table— 6

**Comparison of Education of Elected
and- Nominated Union Councillors**

Nominated NO.. % **29 15 128 67 34 18**

Elected No. %, **126 32 223 56 48 12**

Thin!. -. **NO.% 155 26 351 59 82 15**

191 100 397 100 588 100

(X2 = 18.86, Significant at the 1% level with two degree of freedom)

This, in a way, validates the contention that educated people whose services could not be utilized for the benefit of Union Councils due to their i-eluctance or inability té be elected need to 'be honlinated to **the** council. Also, the fact that the nominated members were better educated suggests that while the electorate generally preferred **the** educated candidates, some better educated people did not prefer to miter the election contest.

Socio-Economic Origin of the, *Councillors*

Democracy becomes a stable political system because it can provide opportunity of articulation and aggregation of divergent interests and views in the society. But before such interests are articulated and aggregated, differentiation - of interests and motivation for their

articulation must exist. One of the major reasons why democracy has not taken root in developing countries probably is that due to the primitive technological level, specialised interests have not emerged. *In* addition, economic and political power is concentraled in such a small number of people that despite the theoretical possibility gf free articulation, it is impossible for the Vast peasantry and. other rural classes to stand against the landed aristocracy. Also the fatalistic and traditional orientation toward life do not create sufficient motivation or participation in the political process.

In this context the question about the socio-economic origin of the leadership in Basic Democracies becomes relevant for determining how the Basic Democracies would provide the base on which an 'upward pyramid of a sound political system cam be developed' and how it would be able to command the confidence of rural people.

It has been suggested that "the elected councillors eome mostly• from the middle and lower middle classes.17 Farmers constitute about 82 per cent of the elected

representativ'es in East Pakistan. In the Western Wing, about 60 per cent of the elected members come from average middle class families. On the other hand, out of a total of 38,475 seats in the province, no more than 472 were captured by the landed gentry."13

Several concepts used in the above quotation such as 'm'ddle and lower middle class', farmers and landed gentry do not have precise empirical referents. The occupations of all the elected councillors are reported to be as followers; agriculturists 48,998, lawyers 288, businessmen 2,588, ex-government servants 391, journalists 10, and the rest are mostly small shopkeepers and tradesmen.19 The predominance of agriculturists, simply reflects the character of the economy wh' ch heavily depends on agriculture. Most of the lawyers and businessmen come from cities.

In the sample, occupations of the councillors have been divded into two major categories, the agriculturists and the non-agriculturists. The agriculturists include all those whose major source of income is agriculture irrespective of whether they own land or only cultivate ft. All other occupations are grouped as non-agriculturists. Eighty-eight per cent of the counclllors are agriculturists and twelve per cent are nonagriculturists. It is significant that nearly same percentage of the coundillors are agriculturists in the *East Pakistan Study* sample.

17. President Ayub Klian, while introdo cing the Basic Democracy system on 27th October, 1959 made this statement.
18. Government of Pakistan, *Dawn* of a *New Era (n.d.),* p. 2t.
19. Khalid Bin Sayeed, 'Pakistan's Basic Democracy' *Middle East Journal,* Vol. 15, No. 3. 1961.

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Out of seventy-one councillors who have been categorised as non agriculturists, thirty seven are in business, nine are doctors, eight are lawyers, seven in private service with the remainder belonging to various other professions. It may be noted

that forty-give out of the seventy..one non-agricultursts get part of their incomes from agriculture and have been categorised as non-agriculturists because agriculture is not their major source of income.

Out of 517 agriculturists and 45 non-agriculturists whose subsidiary occupation is agriculture, fifteen per cent were absentee landlords, **forty** three per cent were landlord-cum-owner cultivators, thirty nine per cent were owner cultivators and three per cent were tenants.

The above findings suggest that the councillors in rural areas predominantly come from agriculture profession. Most of them own, rent out or cultivate land themselves. Among the agriculturists, the tenants who are only three per cent of the sample seem to be under-represented. Similarly the lower rural classes such as artisans and labourers are totally unrepresented.

Economic Status

No exact data about the socio-economic status of the councillors of both wings of the country are available. The election authority of West Pakistan, however, has given the following figures.20

Table—7

Income of the Elected Councillors of West Pakistan

Income per month Percentage
Es. 2,000 and above 8
above Rs. 500 but below Rs. 1,000 30
Above Rs. 100 but below Es. 500 50
Less than 500 - **12**

As no detailed breakdown of incomes of different strata in **the** country is available it is difficult to determine which income groups have greater representation in Basic Democracies, although the possibility of the higher income brackets being over-

represented is strongly suggested by analysis **of** the size of land holdings by the councillors in the present sample.

To determine the socio-economic class of the councillors, the amount_**of** land **which they owned is used as a measure of this status. As**

20. Election authority of West Pakistan, *E1ection RepGrt* (Lahore 1960).

sources of income other than agriculture are very limited in ruia1 West Pakistan, the amount of land owned is generally a reliable measure of this status.21

The 549 land owning Union Councillors belong to the following categories of land ownership —

Table — 8

Amount of Land Owned by 549 Land Owning Union Councillors

Amount of Land owned
1-15
16-50
51-100
acres
207 178 75 89 549
Percentage 38 32 14 16 100

Only 125 per cent of all the owners in West Pakistan own 100 acres and above, while sixteen per cent of the union couttcillors in the present sample own the same amount. The number of councillors owning 100 acres or more is nearly twelve times greater than all the owners of 100 acres and more in West Pakistan. Tin the present sample eighty four per cent of the owners own less than one hundred acres while in West Pakistan ninety eight per cent o the owners belong in this category.22 This

suggests the conclusion that the big land owners have far larger representation in the Union COuncils of the two districts.

Our foregoing analysis suggests that the union councillors predominantly fall in the age group of 30.60 years. Persons who are less than 30 years and more than 60 years of age are elected less frequently than their share in the total population. It appears that there was a tendency to elect younger councillors in East Pakistan than in West Pakistan. In comparison with nominated members, the elected union councillors tend to be younger which is suggestive of the conclusion that intentionally or unintentionally administration tends to prefer older people for nomination than those preferred by the general electorate.

21. We had reason to believe that information about amount of land owned would be relatively more correct than information about annual income in monetary terms as the councillors were likely to know more exactly the amount of their land than their annual income which in fact is rarely calculated.
22. Figures about land ownership patterns in West Pakistan taken from Malik Khuda Bukhsh, *Land Reforms in West Pakisttan* (Lahore, 1960), Vol. I, p. 250.

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union concillors have a literacy rate mare than four times as high as the level of the general population of the country. However, the educational level of the• union coundillors is lower than the members **of** the National Assemb1 and a sample of public servants. The nominated union couneillors tend to be more literate than the e1ected union councillors.

The union euncfllors predominantly 'come from the agricultural sector of the society. The other significant groups are businessmen and lawyers. This, in a way, reflects the character of the economy which is predominantly agricultural but is developing new professional groups. A majority of the councillors come from the medium size land owners, though big land owtiers have a greater share of seats in the Union Councils than their share in the total land owning, groups. In brief, **the** lçlership in

Union Councils is predominantly from. medium age groups, is more literate than the general pQpulation and comes primarily from agriculturists, who own not more than fifty acres of land.

III

Comparative Analysis of the Chairman ant? the Counci1lor

The general electorate elect union councillors who then in turn elect chairmen of the union cäuncils. Therefore, the positon of the chairmen could be considered of higher political influence. The legal definition of the role and status of the chairmen also strengthen the validity of this deduction. The chairman is ex-officio member of the next tier of Basic Democracy, .that is, tehsil council which aggregates lhe demands of the union councils. Due to the provision that half of. the non offcia1 appointed members will be selected from among the cha'rmen **of** union councils, it is certain that some of the chairmen in a district and a division wJl beódme the members of higher tier.

Basic Derocracieg Order makes the chairman the executive head tbe union council who presides over its meetings and conducts on its behalf. He corresponds with the government departments — behalf **of** the council. He acts as chairman of Conciliation Courts and Ntion council. He controls the secretary of the union council. **He** jan-honorarium of Rs. 500 annually.

This legal and political status is further fortified by other factors. The departmental officers usually contact the chairman and sometimes become his guests. He is generally selected for special training courses which enable him to get more intimate knowledge of the government **and en**hance his informal power.23

23. A.T. Rafiqur **Rehman,** "Basic **Democracies and** Rural Development **in East Pakistan,"** i — (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Development in Pakistan* **(Peshawar, 1963k,** *p* 347.'

This enhanced legal, political and informal status of the chairman necessitates a study of the characteristics of the incumbents to determine how far the socio-economic charactaristics re-inforce or weaken this status and how far they qualify the chairman to be an effective head of the Union Council. Further more, an Investigation into the differential status f the chairman from the union councillors would yield insights into the values and standards which go into the selection of "higher" leadership.

Age

We have found earlier that union councillors mostly belong to age group of 30 to 60 years. Do the chairman tend to be younger or older than the union coulzcillors.?24

Table—9

**Comparison of Ages of Thirty Seven Chairmen
and Councillors**

Chairmen Counoiflors
BcLw 30 **years** 8 5
Between 30 **to** 45 " 49 47
Between 46 **to** 60 " 38 36
Above60 5 12
100 100

The above table suggests that chairmen tend to be younger than the counciilors.25 There are more chairmen (8%) below thirty yeais than councillors (5%). conversely there are fewer chairmen beyond thirty years of age (5%) while couneillors of this age are as large as twelve per cent. It is significant that the relationship is reversed in the ages or the chairmen and the councilors in East Pakistan where ten per cent of the councillors are below 30 years while seven per cent of the chairmen are in this category. On the other hand forty one per cent of the chairmen are in age group of 45 to 59 years while thirty six per cent of the councillors are in this category.26 This

leads to an interesting though an enigmatic conclusion. In East Pakistan electorate preferred for membership of Union Council younger people than the electorate in West Pakistan. This was of course understandable in view of the presumed higher political awakening in East Pakistan. But as far selectIon of chairmen is concerned West Pakistan councils preferred younger chairmen in comparison to those in East Pakistan. Why is not the

24. There were thirty nine chairmen in o ur sample but only thirty seven could be ,iewed.
25. It may be noied that *Rawuipindi Study, op. cit., p. 4,* found the same relationh'p.
26.*. East Pakistan Study. op. cit., p. 4.*

presumption of higher political awakening in East Pakistan exerting influence on the selection of chairmen? This problem, of course, nee4' further study.

Education

As the chairman has greater responsibility in the conduct of the business of the union councils, education is a greater functional requirement for him. In East Pakistan, nearly twenty seven per cent of the chairmen have education upto or beyond matriculation, sixty five per cent have education less than this and eight per cent are illiterate.27 In view of the fact that nearly ten per cent of the elected union counefliors are matriculate or more, eighty eight per cent have education less than matriculation and two per cent are illiterate in East Pakistan, it can be concluded that while chairmen tend to have higher level of education than the councillors, percentage of illiterates is greater among the thairnien (8%) than the total elected co'undillors t2%) in East Pakistan. *Zut Pakistan Study's* findings however, show a different trend. In the sample of this study, the percentage of chairmen with higher level of education tends to be greater than the elected union council.lors. No d*airman was found to be illiterate in the sample while three per cent of the councillors were.28 No comparable data about all the chairmen ol West Pakistan is

a'ailable. Only *4nnwd Report* 195940 refers to a lairvey made in Sibi (Quetta Division) which found that out of seventeen persoI elected as chairmen, two were graduates, three were matriculates, tw0 middle pass and four were illiterate.29

In the present sample comparative data on educational level of the irmen and the councillors is as follows —

Table 10

**Comparative Level of Education of Thirty Seven
Chairmen and 551 Councillors**

	illiterate	Upto primary	Eighth grade	Tenth grade	Above tenth grade
Chairmen	0	24	27	27	22
Councillors	26	29	**31**	**9**	**5**
				100	100

27. A. *Report, 1959.60, op. cit., p.* 19.
28. East Pakistan Study*, op. ci t., p.* 39. In *view'* of finding8 of thj8 study, the validity provided by *Annual Report* on this question reenls to be doubtful.
29. Annual *Report,* op. cit., *p.* 19.

No chairman is illiterate while twenty six per cent of the councillors are; on the other hand, twenty two per cent of the chairmen have education above matric (tenth grade), while only five per cent of the councillors have• attained this level of education. In fact forty nine per cent of the chairmen have education upto matric level or beyond it. This cleariy establishes that chairmen are more educated than the councillors and this difference is greater on higher level of education. It may be inferred from this that education of a candidate for thairmanhip was probably an important consideration for his being elected to this position.

Data from previous studies in West Pakistan also confirms the above conclusion that chairmen were generally more literate than the couneillors. The *East Pakistan Study* also found the same trend. No chairman but three per cent of the councillors were illiterate in East Pakistan. On the other hand, eighty six per cent of chairmen had education upto or beyond matric, while only fifty six per cent of the councillors had attained this level. A compai4son of educat ion of the chairmen in East and West as found in the present sample an1 sample• of *East Pakistan Study* reveals that while eighty six per cent of the chairmen in East have education upto or beyond matric, in the West only forty nine per cent have attained this level.30 The chairmen in West Paktan seems to have lower level of education. Also greater percentage of chairmen is Illiterate in West than East Pakistan. This in fact reflects the difference in literacy level in the two wings.31

Occupation

The comparative occupational data about the chairmen and the councillors is as follows —

Table—11

**Comparative Occupational Data of Thirty Seven Chairmen
and 551 Coundillors**

Chairmen Counelilors %
AgriculturIsts 92 88 Non-agrIclilturIstS 8 12 100 100

30. *East Pakistan Study., op. cit., p.* **39.**
31. Government of Pakistan, Population Census of 1961, *Literacy and Education Hulletin,* No. 4.

The above data reveals that there were slightly more chairman from among the agriculturists than the councillors. It is interesting that the reverse appears to be true

in East Pakistan where eighty seven per cent councillors and eighty one per cent of the chairmen were agriculturists.32 This may be suggestive of the conclusion that 'higher' leadership in union councils is recruited more from professional groups in East Pakistan than in West Pakistan.

As indicated earlier, size of land owned is one relatively reliable measure of wealth - and richness. Data about the comparative size of land owned by the chairmen and the councillors is presented below —

Table — 12

Comparative Data about the Size of Land owned by Chairmen and Councillors

1 to 15 acres 16t050
Above 50 Chairmen 14 22 64
100 CcuncillOrs % 38 32 30 100
Chairmen ¼ 22 *67*
11 Couneillors - 15 43 39
S 0 100 100

Fourteen per cent of the chairmen and thirty eight per cent of the uncil1ors owned over fifteen acres. On the other hand sixty four percent of the chairmen and thirty per cent of the councillors owned more than 50 acres. This clearly establishes that chairmen were bigger landowners than the councillors. One previous study confirms this conclusion.33 No data about the patterns of land ownership is available from East Pakistan. However, evidence is available that chairmen generally tended to be richer than the councillors.34

Table — 13

Comparative Land Tenure Status of chairmen and Councillors

Absentee landlords
Lanc)!ord cum cUltivatOrs Owner cultivators

32. East Pakistan Study., op. cit., p. 42.

33. Rawalpindi Study., op. ci.t, p. 4.

34. East Pakistan *Study., op. cit., p.* 41. A1o see the *Annual*

Report 1959-60, op. cit., p. **19.**

More chairmen are absentee landlords than the councilors. On the other hand no tenant has become chairman from among three per cent of the tenant councillors.

It is significant to note that seventy three per cent chairmen were from the elected and twenty seven per cent from the nominated councillors. As there were thirty two per cent - nominated councillors in the sample, it is indicative of the fact that larger numl5èr of chairmen were elected from the elected rather than the nominated councillors.

There seems to exist stronger tendency of electing elected councillors as chairmen, as eighty five per cent of the chairmen were elected counciiors and fifteen per cent were nominated.35

The fact that the chairmen are younger, more educated and own more land than the union councillors have significant implications for the effective functioning of union councils as well general political development of rural society. Firstly, it means that leadership and power is gradually shifting from the old and illiterates to the young and literates who can be instrumental in diffusion of new ideas and can bring a more dynamic and flexible approach to rural problems. In fact they can serve a bridge between the modernised sector of the Pakistani society and the relatively isolated conservative rural masses.

That the chairmen are relatively bigger landowners shows that the informal hierarchy of power existing in the rural society is being formalised by the institution of local government. Znfluence and power, as our analysis in subsequent section shows, are significantly associated with the size of land one owns. Besides other factors, size of land brings power and influence to the larger owner which then further enhances his influence by enabling him to capture the position of chairmanship of the unon. council. The fact that the union councillors came from medium size landowners and in the union council they were led by still bigger landowners is likely to influence the nature of interests and problems which are articulated in the council and communicated to the bureaucracy.

The chairmen were distinguished from the councillors by several other socio-cultural characteristics. Not only were they more educated but they had a better level of general knowledge, possessed higher level of communication competence and tended to be members of interest groups more frequently. They were more regular in attending the meetings of the councils. More of them had political affiliations. More of them tended to hold liberal political and social opinions. For instance a greater number of them supported Family Laws Ordinance, a greater number of them was partly westernised. This further qualified them to

35. *Annual Repcrt lg596O, op. dt., p.* 19.

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be an effective and viable bridge between the ruling bureaucratic and' political elite which is struggling to modernise the society and inartrculate1 conservative rural masses with an apathetic and parochial orientation to the political system and national society.

IV

Level of Influence of the Councillors

In the last two sections the socio-economic characteristics of the union councillors and the chairmen of union councils have been analysed. It has been found that union coundilors were more literate than the general society, and the chairmen were more literate than the union councillors. Union councillors came from medium size land owners while chairmen generally tended to be larger land owners than the councillors. Also that the chairmen were modern in their views and ideas than the counciliors and generally tençied to be younger. This establishes an hierarchy of modernity and competence (if literacy could be assumed to add to one's competence) combined with and supported by hierarchy of wealth indicated by size of land- owned.

The next issue which need analysis is how far this hierarchy of leadership formalised by Basic Democracies is influential, because on degree of its influence depends its effectiveness to mobilise the rural society for national reconstruction. Equally important will be the question about the basis of its influence which will determine the direction and purpose for which the leaders in Basic Democracies would exercise their influence.

It has been suggested that the union councillors were generally not influential themselves but only instruments of the influential people who did not contest the Basic Democracies election.36 The detractors of the system generally allege that the old politicians and big landlords placed their personal servants, who did not have any influence independent of their masters in election contests. Implication usually by this is that the union councillors lack the necessary popular support.

This point of view presumes a power for the big landlord which he possesses only in few areas. It also overlooks the prevalence of peasant proprietorship both in former Punjab, former NWFP and part of Sind and ignores the possibility of existence of autonomous areas of influence and power in tie rural West Pakistan which may contract power alliance with big landlords but still enjoy local influence on the basis of which they could win certain privileges from the big landlords.

36. Harry J. Friedman, "Pakistan's Experiment in Basic Democracies," *Pacific Affairs, Vol 33 No. 2.* 1960, p. 120.

The evidence of the union councillors themselves overwhelmingly refutes the point of view which assigns them only aft instrumental character.

Out of 652 persons chosen as influential by the councillors, 120 (18%) fall in the category of highly nf1uentials and 53 are categorised as influential. Fifty eight per cent of the 652 persons chosen as influentials (including highly influentials) are members of the union councils. Of the highly influential in the union, a large majority are members of the council.37

Table — 14

Association between Membership of Union Council and Level of liz1uence

Highly IninI:ueiit1als Influentials Total

No. % No. Counci1iors **99 33 276 52** 375 Non-councillors 21 **17 256 48 277**

130 100 532 100 652

(X2 = **37.60** significant at .001 level with one degree of freedom)

What are the characteristics of the union councillor who were rated highly influential or influential?

In traditional patriarchal and tribal societies, one significant source of influence is the age. When other sources of getting knowledge and experience are limited or absent, naturally experience accumulated through relatively longer life establishes a claim of superior wisdom over others and thereby ensures influence. Also as one becomes older, and uumber of sons, and grand sons multiply and web o kinship extends, with it extends the area of influence. –

Age, however, seems to be a source of influence only in a relatively isolated society functioning in homogeneous and stabl environment. The rural society of Pakistan is

increasingly being drawn into the currents of national and international society Forces external to village influence its internal operations. The old 'cognitive maps', and folkioristic knowledge

37. The method used *for* locating the influential was the following: All the councillors were asked to name three persons whom they *regarded* influential persons in their union. It may be noted that the question was not asked about the menibers *of* the union council but all the people in the union which is an area rather thaw a body. The total choices given by the councillors to every inficeutial pessou were computed nd on the ba&ss *of* choices received by them they were categorised as inuluentials and highly influential,. Th0 persons receiving one to three choices were categorised as influentials and those whq scored more than three as highly inlluentials.

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accumulated through age are of no use to comprehend and manage <u>these expternal</u> forces. This **is** making age an irrelevant factor in leadership. Our earlier analysis has shown that position of greater political significance is being occupied by younger people. This generalisation seems to be true to limited extent about the basis of inUuence also. The younger counciflors tend to be more among the high influentials than the older people.

Table —15

**Association Between Age and Level of Influence of
588 Councillors**

30 100 **490** 100

(X2 = 3.6, not significant)

As indicated earlier the isolation of the village is breaking and it is becoming subject of manifold external influences, traditional knowledge is no longer a source of influence. On the other hand formal education which enables to have a more realistic

understanding of the environment and improve one's competence to manipulate **it** to the advantage of the rural society is becoming a more attractive and functional substitute for traditional wisdom. Where formal education is accessible only to a few, naturally it helps to increase the influence of the literate in comparison to the illiterate. That **this in fact is** happening is borne out from our data.

Table — 16

Education Total upto and beyond 10th standard ¼ **No. % 48 30** 37285 **41 34 41 237 11 18 22 66**

itluentia1s Jy infuentiaI
Below 30 30-60 years Above 60 Totsi
years **No. 17 56 9 30 4 14**
No. 230 203 57
68 100 588

Association Between Level of influence and Level of Education of 588 Councillors
Illiterate Educated upto **eight standard**
y influentiis
No. % No. 85 **55 170 61 39 142 9 6 39**
155 100 **351**
100 **82** 100 588

(X2 = 15.01 Significant at .01 level with four degree of freedom) '

With increase in the level of one's education one's level of influence

%	No.	%	
47	**38**	56	285
41	**25**	**37**	237
12	5	7	66

Earlier it has been suggested that in the traditional society the size of one's !amxly and kinship was a significant factor in deterfnining one's level of influence.. These ties sustained ingroup feelings and eriured obedience to the command of the patriarch. These are still important sources of influence hilt alongwith them are emerging new groups organised around occupational and other interests. The new groups on the one han& improve bargaining powers of the members in extracting favours from bureaucracy and on the other hand enhance the ability ot members to improve their material condition. In this way they becomt source of influence for them.

Table — 17.

**Association Between Organisation Membership of
Interest groups and Level of Influence**

Not Member of Member of Total
Interest Groups Interest Groups
No. ¼ No.
tTninfluentlls 205 52 80 42 285
Influentlals 157 39 79 42 235
Rigbly 1nfluentals 36 **9** 30 16 **68**
398 100 **189** 100 587

(X2 21.447 Significant at .001 level with 2 degree of freedom)

It is evident from the above data that a greater percentage of members of the new interest groups are included in the influentials and highly influentials.

Only twenty five per cent o the union coundiliors in this sample have been affiliated to some political organisations in the past. But **it** appears that the union councillors who have been regarded highly influential tend to be more frequently politically affiliated than the un-Influentlals. This suggests the possibility that political affillat!on tends to enhance on&s influence.

Table — 18

**Association Between Level of Influence and Political
Affiliation of 588 Councillors**

Councillors with Members without Total
po1!ical political
affiliation affiliatIon

No. % No. ¾
Tin-Influefltiais **81 37** 224 **53** 285
InfluenUals **71 44 166 3** 237
Highly influentlais **31 19** 35 8 66
163 100 425 100588

(X2 18.669 Significant at .001 level with 2 degree *f frecom)

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Control over means of production have been generally associated with influence. In rural society of Pakistan this is all the mare true where material resources are more scarce than human.. The owners of land on whom depend the *tenants,* artisans and labourers for their livelihood tend to have larger influence. Also the larger landowners can spare resources for spending on social activities like entertainment of government servants and other visitors which enables, them **to influence lower bureaucracy and middle range** rural 1eadership **That** bigger **landowners tended to** be **more influential is** confirmed by our data.

Table — 19

**Association Between Level of Influence
and Size of Land owned by Councillors**

Medium Owners Big Ownça
%. No. %

48 60 37

43 61 37

9 43 26

207 100 178 100 164 100 549

(X2 = 52.4 Significant at 1% level at 4 degree of freedom)

The influence is exercised through organisation. Therefore, as found earlier it is characteristic of influential people that they become more politically affiliated and also become members of interest groups. From this it could be also expected that influential councillors would be more frequently occupying the position of Influence chairmanship of the union council. Therefore, it is hypothesized that a highly influential councillor is more likely to be the chairman of his union council.

Table — 20

**Association Between Level of Influence and
Chairmanship of Union Councils**

37 100 551 100 588

fluit1a1s ntia1s W'i influentials

Small owners No.

119 58 86

81 39 77 7 3 15

26 219 65 1141g

Chairman of Councils 14o. 2 6 6 16 29 78

Counciflors No. 283

231 37 % 51 42 7

Total 285 237 68

(X2 = 177.825 Significant at .001 level with 2 degree of freedom)

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Foregoing analysis has indicated that the thesis that union. councillors were not influential people themselves and were rather instruments of influential is not proved.

On the other hand evidence of the union councillors suggest that majority of them will be regarded influential or highly influential. Iii fact a great majority (83%) of the people considered highly influential in the unions of the two districts were from among the union councillors.

Among the union councillors, the influential and highly influential persons are charcterised by being more educated, younger in age, members of newly emerging interest groups and political parties, chairman of their union councils and big landowners. All these characteristics of the highly influentials among councillor5 could be regarded positive factors in modernisation of the rural society except the characteristics of being big landowner. But in view of fact that there seems to be a corresponding increase in the power of small landowners due to their association with local politics, preponderence of this factor is likely to be mitigated.

Chapter VI

POLITICAL INFORMATION AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

In parochial political cultures, political communication is oral a inter-personal.1 There are no specialised structures (media) of political communication. As a result, the level of political information of the citizen remains low. To some extent this is true for the subject cultures in which political communication is unilateral, from the ruler to the ruled, and is controlled. In such a culture orientation towards the political system being apathetic or alienated the information of the citizen about the political system, therefore, also is not of a high level.

The political culture prevalent in the rural society of Pakistan can be regarded as a mixture of the parochial and the subject. The parochial character emerges from its isolated, village-centered political activities. The subject character is a product of the rural society's relationship with an alien government represented by a benevolent guardian bureaucracy. However, the isolation of the village is in the process of

elimination. Education, mass media of communication, extension of government organisation, greater mobility between city and villages, economic hiterdependence of the village, town, and city are forces which me hastening this process. But of greater significance in this regard is the emergence of a newly created unit of local government, i.e., the union council. The subject character of the political culture is h changed under the pressure generated by the new political status of the state, new relationships between bureaucracy and the masses with emphasis on partnership and finally, structural constraints created by the Basic Democracies.

This change in the character of the political culture and ecology of the village is expected to reflect in the information level of the villagers and their ability to profit from the mass media of communication. In the following sections an effort is made to determine the level of political information of the councilors and how much they use the modern media

I. On the role of communication m political development see Lucian W Pye *Commziraccatum kal* **Developme,it** (Princeton, 1963)and Danial Lerner, **Pasng of Traditiord** *S.itsjr* (Illinois, 1958), p. 55.

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II

Political Information

It is difficult to determine what knowledge 1s politically important and should be known to a rural leader. However, a tentative index of political information has been constructed which includes items such a knowleige of the name of some countries, name of some important political functionaries, elementary knowledge of some major aspects of foreign policy of the country, and basic facts about the United Nations.

The union councillors were asked to indicate the name of the Governor of West Pakistan, the name of the Chief Justice of West Pakistan, ax the name of the

Commander-in.Chief of the Pakistan Army. The President's name, being too well known waS not asked.

TAB 21

Knowledge of the Councillors about the Names of
Three important Government Functionaries

Those who knew Those who did Total
the name correciy not laiow the
name correctly
No. % No.
Name of the Provincial Governor 469 80 119 20 588
Na*ze Of the Provincial Chief 149 25 15 588
JU&tieo
Name çf the Commander-IU-Chief 365 62 223 38 588
of akIstan Army.

It is evident from the above table that the name of the Provincial Governor is known to eighty per cent of the councillors, while only twenty-flve per cent knew the name of the Provincial Chief Justice. To the questinn regarding the number of tiers in Basic Democracies, eIghty- one per cent could give the correct answer.2 Eighteen per cent said there were three tiers and one per cent said that there were two tiers.

In. order to assess the degree of their awareness of national problems union councillors were aked to indicate wba will they do if they became the president ofthe country. It may be noted that generally the oundiflors were not willing to assume that they could become the president of their

2. There were five tiers of Basic Democracies till 1961 when the provincial legislature was *introduced* and the provincial Advisory Council which etmstitutetl that fifth tier was dissolved. Therefore, both replies giving four and *five* tie were considered correct.

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country, and answered the question when repeatedly asked by the investigators. Even then fifty-four persons did riot know what they would do if they became president of the country.

Answers to the *question* were as follows—

TABLE 22

The Changes which the Councillors will bring if they became the President of the *Country*

Number Percentage
Development and modernisation of agriculture
Enforce Islamic Sharia in the country Industrialize the country Eradicate corruption *from* the country Solve the Kashmir Problem Work for the betterment of the condition of masses (2ange the foreign policy of Pakistan Impart religious education to the masses Others
242 **33 152 20 135 18 59 8 80 11 44 6 18 2 18 2 0 0**
Total 748 100

From the above table it emerges that according to the majority of the councillors there existed three major problems which they would try to tackle i8 they become the president of the country. These major problems include modernisation of the two sectors of the economy of the country, that is, agriculture and industry, establishing Islamic social order in the country and, solution of the Kashmir problem.

The councillors were asked to cite the names of at least five countries of the world. This was done in order to test the level of their knowledge about the external world. Seventy-nine per cent of the councillors could cite five names; eleven per cent could cite four names; five per cent could cite two names and five per cent could name only one country. Three per cent did not know the name of any country.

The five most frequently cited countries were USA, India, Russia, UK and Iran. The United States received ten per cent, UK received nine per cent and Iran received

eight per cent of all the citations. The frequencies of citation about other countries appear in appendix I.

Nearly sixty-five per cent of the councillors knew that there existed a world organization which could settle disputes among the nations of the world. Fifty-five per cent of the councillors could correctly name this organization as the United Nations. Only twnety per cent of the councillors could correctly tell that the headquarters ofl the United Nations were in New York and only eighteen per cent of Them correctly knew the name of its Secretary General, U Thant.

Compared to the level of knowledge about provincial government functionaries, The councillor's knowledge about the United Nations was poor which, of course, is quite understandable. On the other hand the fact that. more than half of the councillors were aware of the existence of the United Nations, nearly a quarter of them knew where its headquarters were and one out of every six knew the name of its General Secretary shows how the changes in the ecology of village are reflected in the political information.

The councillors were asked to indicate the countries which they thought were friendly towards Pakistan. The five countries which received highest citations as friendly towards Pakistan were the USA. Iran, Turkey, China and Saudi Arabia. The United States got twenty -seven .per cent, Iran- seventeen per cent, Turkey eleven per cent, China nine per cent and Saudi Arabia eight per cent ol all the citations. In interpreting these citations it should not be forgotten that the survey was conducted in 1961, before the border conflict between China and India and it is quite likely that councillors' opinion might have shifted in 1964. The citations received by all the countries appear in the Appendix I.

Taking into view the history of foreign policy of Pakistan, the opinion of the councillors would be generally regarded as accurate. Pakistan has been an ally of the USA since 1954 and relations between the two coi.intries have been cordial before the Sino-Indian border conflict. Iran and Turkey are members of 'Cento and

have close cultural and ,historical ties with Pakistan. Saudi Arabia received higer citation because of the religious significance of the country. A significant position of China in order of citations received probably stems from the absence of any history of conflict between the two countries.

Countries most frequently mentioned as being hostile towards Pakistan were India, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. IndIa got forty- four per cent, Afghanistan twenty-eight per cent and the Soviet Union twenty-one per cent of all the citations. These citations reflect that the councillors were not generally unaware of the foreign relations of their country. Citations received by different countries appear in the Appendix

Finally the councillors were asked to give their judgement regarding the countries with which Pakistan should be friendly. Most frequently mentioned countries were the USA, Iran, Turkey Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia. The United States received eighteen per cent, Iran fourteen per cent, Turkey eleven per cent and Saudi Arabia eight per cent of all the citations. Again in interpreting this poll the significant fact that it was carried out in 1961, before the Sino-Indian border conflict should be kept in mind. It is significant that while the USA received twenty-seven per cent of the citations as friendly towards Pakistan, it received only nineteen per cent of the citations regarding the countries with which Pakistan should be friendly. Iran lost three per cent of the citations while the position of Turkey remained the same It is significant that while Afghanistan received twenty-eight per cent of the citations for being hostile towards Pakistan, it also received ten per cent of the citations that Pakistan should be friendly towards it.

The councillors were asked to indicate why Pakistan should be friendly to a country. The following table gives the answers—

Table 23

**Reasons Why Pakistan Should be Friendly towards
a Country, given by 58B Councillors**

Number Percentage

Because Pakistan receives economic assistance from

Such a country/countries Because they are neighbours Because defence of Pakistan required it Because it was politically desirable Other reasons.

269 35 258 34 87 11 72 9 53 7 28 4 767 100

All the above reasons given by the councillors show an adequate awareness among the councillors of the important considerations which should determine the foreign policy of Pakistan. The reason given could hardly be considered parochial and particularistic.

The above analysis suggests that the level of information of the councillors varies with the distance of the object of information from the village. The nearer the object of information, the better the information.

This, of course, is understandable. More significant than this however, is the fact that at least part of the rural leaders have knowledge of such remote objects such as the United Nations and its Secretary General. This, in turn, supports the earlier observation that parochial and subject orientation toward the political environment is changing in rural• Pakistan.

A differential level of political information is found to exist among the counciilors. What characteristics of the councillors explain this difference?

For having political information, firstly, a councillor should have motivation for accumulating such information and secondly he should have the necessary ability to profit from the media of political information. The motivation to have political information depends upon the social position of the person which provide him opportunities as well as generate pressures for having political information. The

ability to use mass media of communication depends upon the level of formal education s well as motivation to use them.

Due to the higher status which the chairman of the union council enjoys, and the greater frequency of his contact with the bureaucracy and government, it could be expected that the he would have a higher level of political information than the councillors. Also it is likely that the councillors, while electing the chairman, might have taken into account his level of political information.

Table — 24

Comparative Level of Political Information of the Councillors and Thirty-seven Chairmen

Chairmen Councillors Total

No. % No.

Poor political information 0 0 72 13 72

Fair potitical information 34 92 466 85 500

Good palitièal information 3 8 13 2 16

37 100 551 100 588

(X2 = 7.4, significant at 5% level with 2 degrees of freedom)

The above data establishes that the chairmen tend to have a higher level of political information than the other members.

The councillors who have had political affiliation in the past are supposed to have a greater motivation to get more knowledge about the

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political environments.3 Therefore it could be expected that councillors with political affiliations would have a higher level of political information than those without political affiliation.

Table — 25

Association between Level of Political Information and Political Affiliation of 588 Councillors

Members with political affiliation

No. % No.

Poor political Information 17 10 55 13

Pair political information 138 85 362 85

Good political information 5 8 2

100 425 100

($X2 = 4.538$, not significant)

The politically affiliated councillors seem to have higher political information, but the relationship is not statistically significant as is indicated in table 25.

Another source of distinction in position among the councillors is the amount of land owned. It might be expected that the councillors owning greater amounts of land would have greater political information.

Table — 26

Association between Political Information of the Councillors and Size of Land

Small land Medium land Big land Total

owners owners owners

No. % No. % No. %

Poor political

Information

Fair political

Information

Good political Information

39 19 21 10 10 6 70

166 80 153 85 144 88 463

2 1 4 5 10 6 16

(X2 = 21, significant at 1% with four degrees of freedom).

1 By political environment is understood the national, and international environment of the village society.

<div align="center">

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</div>

The data supports the above hypothesis. However, the question which needs further investigation is whether the level of political information of big land owners is greater due to the influence of the size of land or due to the fact that larger land owners tend to be more educated.4 Further analysis of partial relationships shows that among the illiterate councillors no relationship exists between political information and the level of education. This is also true for the councillors having education upto and beyond matriculation. Th means that the amount of land one owns does not exercise any influence over one's political information independent of education. Therefore the higher level of political information among the big land owners is not due to the amount of land owned but because they are more educated than the small land owners.

Besides one's socio-economic and political status, one's ability to profit from mass media of communication could be an influence on one's level of political information. This ability in turn depends to a large extent on one's level of education. Therefore it could be expected that the more educated councillors would have higher political information.

<div align="center">

Table — 27

**Association between Educational Level and Political
Information of 588 Councillors**

</div>

Illiterate Education upto Education upto eighth standard tenth grade and beyond

Poor political information Fair political Information Good political information

58 37 18 5 0 0

96 62 328 93 72 87

1 1 5 2 10 13

155 100 351 100 82 100

($X2 = 111.0$, significant at 1% level with 4 degree of freedom)

There seems to exist a strong relationship between the level of literacy and the level of political information.

To be literate and to have motivation for using one's literacy for gaining political information may not co-exist. Therefore, it need to be analysed whether the more educated have greater political information

4. There exists a strong 1elationship ($X' = 16.00$) between size of land and level of education.

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because they utilise mass media of communication or due to other reasons. Our subsequent analysis establishes a strong relationship betwe1 the level of literacy and the use of mass media of communication (see the following section). The relationship between the use of mass media (communication competence) and political information also is strong.

Table — 28

**Association between Communication Competence
and Political Information**

Low communication Medium communication High communication. total
competence competence competence

Poor Political Information Fair Political Information Good political Information

41 31 30 16 0 0 71

89 68 250 84 161 98 500

1 1 3 0 12 2 16

131 100 283 100 173 100 587

($X2 = 82.6$, significant at 1% level with four degrees of freedom)

Among the illiterate councillors no significant relationship existed between communication competence and political information. In the literate couneillors having education upto eighth standard there is a strong association between communication competence and political information.5 However, in the highly educated group with education beyond eighth grade there is again no relationship between political information and communication competence.

This brings us to an interesting conclusion that while communication competence and political information have strong positive associations in the group of councillors with educatioh upto eighth standard, no such relationship exists for councillors .vho are illiterate or who have education upto and beyond matriculation. As the illiterate councillors are likely to have less access to the mass media of communication, the absence of such relationship is understandable. But why, in case of more educated group is the political information not related to their use of media of communication (communication competence)? One plausible explanation would be that while councillors having education ufto eighth standard might be depending on newspaper, radio aa magazines included in our communication competence index for

5. S. Chj Square 41, significant with four 4egvee *,f* freedom at the 1% level.

political information, the more educated councillors may have access to such knowledge through other media such as books, contact with knowledgeable and more educated people. This in fact means that education alone cannot explain the difference in political information and only a certain educated group has higher

political information because they make use of mass media. Also, the use of mass media do not have any influence on the level of political information independent of education. –

The above attempts to explain the difference between political information among the councillors lead to the conclusion that the literacy level, level of communication competence and status of the councillor in the union council (to be chairman) largely influence one's level of political information. The highly educated coüncillors have greater political information because of their level of education. The councillors with some education whose level of political izformation is high have higher level because they utilise mass media of communication more.

<center>III</center>

<center>***Communication Competence***</center>

In primitive political system, political communication is generally person to person and is not affectively neutral. As indicated earlier, this can be true for only an isolated primitive political system. The rural society in Pakistan, being in a process of change does not entirely rely on personal and oral communication. Gradually the mass media of communication are being used by rural leaders even in remote villages. What is the frequency of the use of mass media among the rural leaders and what are the characteristics of those who come into contact with mass media more frequently are questions which will be investigated in the present section.

Out of the 588 councillors, thirty (5%) owned a radio. Five per cent of the councillors stated that they regularly listened to a radio, fifty-two per cent said they listened only occassionally and forty-three per cent said they never listened to radio.

Twenty-five per cent of the councillors read one or more newspapers regularly, twenty-nine per cent read a newspaper only casually, and forty-six per -cent did not read any newspaper. Only nine per cent of the councillors read some journals and magazines regularly, five per cent read casually and eighty-six per cent did not read any journal or magazine. *Pak Jamhuriat,* a weekly magazine issued by the Central

Government which concentrates on problems of Basic Democracies, is read by eighteen per cent of the councillors regularly, by twenty-four per cent casually and by fifty-eight per cent it is not read at all.

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The Basic' Democracies Order is a legal document which describes the structure and functions of Basic Democracies. As it was widely circulated by the government in English as well as in regional languages, **it** could be included in the media of mass communication. Thirty per cent of the councillors stated that they had read the Order.

From the above description it emerges that among the mass media available to the councillors, newspapers are read more frequently, next comes Pak Jamhuriat, then come journals and magazines and finally the least used media is the radio. This is inspite of the fact that each union council was provided a transistor radio set.

Besides the frequency of use of mass media, the quality of **the** media used have a significant bearing on the quality of political communication in the society. Councillors who listened to radio regularly **or** casually were asked to indicate their preferred radio programs. Out **of** 364 preferences indicated, fifty-six per cent were for the news, thirty- four per cent for speeches, and fourteen per cent were for songs. This situation could be regarded favourable for political communication. Among the journals and magazines generally read were *Khudam-ud-Din, Iwrat Nama, Talimul Quran, Panorama, and the Reader's Digest.* The first three journals have predominantly religious contents and a diffused political orientation. *Panorama,* is the publicity organ of the United States Information Centre in Pakistan. None of the journals with predominantly political and literacy contents seems to be popular with councillors. No technical journals were mentioned.

Out of the newspapers read only the Pakistan Times seemed to **be** equally popular in both districts which are about 100 miles apart.

Table — 29

**Frequencies of Newspapers Read Regularly by
Councillors in two Districts**

Abad Sultanpur

Read regulary Read regularly

	No.	%	No.	%
Kohstan	1	1	55	39
mb.baz	49	41	1	1'
Tameer	—		34	24
Anjam	32	27	3	2
Jang	4	3	1	1
Bang-e-Haram	19	16	—	—
Nawa-i-Waqat	1	1	11	8
Pakistan Times	10	8	7	**5**
Hilal	1	1	7	**5**
Imroz	1	1	4	**3**
	118	99	123	88

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This is a significant phenomena and confirms the conclusion that political communication in transitional societies is heterogeneous and fragmentary.6 The newspapers generally read by the union councillors were those which have localistic orientation. This is likely to further strengthen local interests and loyalities of the councillors and thereby retard the growth of national consciousness. The fragmentary and h2terogeneous nature of political communication is further coafirmed by the level of communication competence (or frequency of use of mass media) in the two districts.7

Table — 30

**Distribution of Comparative Communication
Competence in the two Districts**

Abad Sultanpur Total

	Abad		Sultanpur		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Low communication competence	108	36	23	8	131	22
Medium communication competence	121	40	162	56	183	43
High communication competence	69	24	104	36	173	30
	298	100	289	100	587	100

(X2 59.6, significant at 1% level with two degrees of freedom)

Communication competence is not evenly distributed among all the councillors. Twenty-ninen per cent have high, forty-eight per cent medium and twenty-two per cent low communication competence. What factors are associated with the differential level of this competence need to he analysed.

First it appears that the status of the councillors in the union is related to their communication competence. The chairmen have a significantly higher level of communication competence than the councillors.

6. Gabrial Almond and Jan Coleman, *Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton, 1963), *pp.* 50-52 and Lucian W. Pye, *Communications and Po1ikal Development* (Princeton. 1963). p. *26.*

7. **An** index **of** communication competence was constrttcted. **See Methodological** Appendix.

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Table 31

**Comparative Communication Competence of Chairmen
of the Union Councils and the Councillors**

	Chairmen		Councillors		Total	
	No	%	No.	%		
low communication competence	1	**3**	**130**	**24**		
Medium communication competence	7	19	276	**50**		
High conimunicatin competence	**29**	**78**	144	**26**		
	37	100	**550**	100	**587**	100

(X2 161.20, significant at 1% level with 1 degree of freedom).

Literacy is the ability to profit from the printed media of communication, while as defined here, communication competence is the actual use of various media of communication. As most of the media of communication on can be exploited only if one is literate, it can be expected that there will be a positive association between communication competence and literacy.

Table — 32

Association between Literacy and Communication 'Competence of the Councillors

	Illiterate		Literacy upto eighth grade		Literacy upto matric & above		Total	
Low communication Competence	78	51	51	15	2	2	131	23
Medium communication Competence	75	48	186	53	22	27	283	49
High communication Competence	1	1	113	32	58	71	172	28
	154	100	**350**	100	**82**	100	586	100

* Two persons not included.

(X2 = 177.9, significant at 1% level with 4 degrees of freedom).

Lerner has found an association between communication competence. The more literate a councillor, the higher level of communication competence he is likely to possess.

Does the level of communication competence affect the level of political participation? Research by Danial Lerner8 arid Phillips Cutright9 have found a positive association between communication and political development of various countries. In the present study such association is attempted with political affiliation as indicated by the fact of being

8. Danial Lerner, *The Passing of Traditionat Society* (Illinois. USA, 1958),
9. Philips Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis", *American Sociological Review,* Vol. 28, No. 2, 253-264.

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member of a political party.10 It appears that there is no significant relationship between the use of media and political affiliation.

Table —. 33

**Association between Communication Competence
and Political Affiliation**

Affiliated to a political party
Not affiliated to a political party Total
No. % NO. % No. %
Low communication 30 19 101 24 131 22
Competence
Medium communication 74 45 209 49 283 49
Competence
High Communication 59 36 114 27 173 29
163 100 423 100 587 100

(X2 = 5, not significant at 5% level)

Lerner has found an association between communication competence and what he calls modernisation.11 The present data also shows that the greater the communication competence of a councillior the greater his proneness to accept western values.12

Table — 34.

Association between Communication Competence and Westernisation of the Councillors

Non-westernised councillors Slightly westernized councillors Partly westernized councillors Total

No. % No. % No % NO. %
No communication 4 40 104 26 22 13 130 22
Competence
Low communication 4 40 208 51 70 41 828 49
Competence
Medium
Communication 2 20 94 23 77 46 173 29
Competene
10 100 406 100 169 100 585 100

(X2 = 20.284, significant at .001 level with degrees of freedom)

10. See chapter VIL
11. Danial Lerner, *op.* cit., p. 63. Lerner has used participation in voting as indicator of political participation.
12. About acceptance of Western Values and attitude, see chapter 9.

The above analysis has pointed out that the communication competence of a councilor is related to his status in the council, his level of literacy, his political affiliation and proneness to accept western values. This, in fact, is further evidence of the fragmentary nature of political communications. Not only the regions and areas differ in the use of mass media but within the same area and region different persons with different status, educational level, political interest and degree of exposure of external values have differential access to them

Chapter VII

UNION COUNCILLORS, INTEREST GROUPS AND POLITICAL PARTIES

Introduction

Associational interest groups and political parties play significant roles in political socialisation and recruitment. They are instrumental in preparing the citizens for specialised roles and thereby facilitate the process of political modernisation. Associational interest groups' primary role, however, is that of interest articulation and the more a society relies on this media of interest articulation in preference to other media; the better the boundary between society and polity.1 Similarly, the primary role of political parties is interest aggregation and the willingness to assign this function to political parties in a society 1s an indication of a good boundary maintenance between polity and society.2

It has been found that generally the transitional societies lack associational interest groups. Although political parties may exist, they are not effective enough to exclusively perform their assigned functions. As a result interest articulation is done through non-associational, institutional and anomic interest groups and the function of interest aggregation is poorly performed or is taken up by institutional or anomie interest groups.3

These conclusions about transitional societies apply rigorously to Pakistan in general and the rural sector of Pakistani society in' particular. Only a small number of associational interest groups have emerged in the urban part of the society. Even

these are weak and poorly organised and lack the necessary autonomy. Quite a few of them are organised around communal and caste lines and lack specificity' of interest. In the rural part of the society they are almost non-existent. As a result, the

1. Gabrial Almond and James Coleman, *Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton, 1960), *pp.* 3536.
2. *Ibid., p.* 40.
3. *Ibid., pp.* 548, 551456.

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